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Abstract
Nowadays all existing public key cryptosystems are classified into three categories
relied on different mathematical foundations. The first one is based on the difficulty of
factoring the product of two big prime numbers. The representatives are the RSA and
the Rabin cryptosystems. The second one such as the ElGamal cryptosystem is based
on the discrete logarithm problem. The last one is based on the NP-completeness of
the knapsack problem. The first two categories survived crypto attacks, whereas the
last one was broken and there has been no attempt to use such a cryptosystem.
In order to save the last category, Kiriyama proposed a new public key cryptosystem
based on the non-linear knapsack problem, which is an NP-complete problem. Due
to the non-linear property of the non-linear knapsack problem, this system resists all
known attacks to the linear knapsack problem. Based on his work, we extend our
research in several ways.
Firstly, we propose an encrypted secret sharing scheme. We improve the security of
shares by our method over other existing secret sharing schemes. Simply speaking, in
our scheme, it is hard for outsiders to recover a secret even if somehow they could collect
all shares, because each share is already encrypted when it is generated. Moreover, our
scheme is efficient.
Then we propose a multiple identities authentication scheme, developed on the basis
of the non-linear knapsack scheme. It verifies the ownership of an entity’s several
identities in only one execution of our scheme. More importantly, it protects the privacy
of the entities from outsiders. Furthermore, it can be used in resource-constrained
devices due to low computational complexity.
xWe implement the above schemes in the C language under the Linux system. The
experimental results show the high efficiency of our schemes, due to low computational
complexity of the non-linear knapsack problem, which works as the mathematical
foundation of our research.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Motivation
With the wide use of computers and communication networks such as Internet, more
and more commercial activities, traditional businesses or government services, can be
implemented on the Internet. However, as we all know, communications over open
networks are not secure. An effective solution to secure communication over open net-
works is to apply cryptographic schemes to protect the transmitted messages. Simply
speaking, cryptography is the study of mathematical techniques related to the aspects
of information security [41]. Cryptography addresses the following four goals [41]:
1. Confidentiality : to protect the content of information from those unauthorized
to read it
2. Data integrity : to assure no alteration or replacement of data by those unautho-
rized
3. Authentication: to verify the validity of data and the identity of senders
4. Non-repudiation: to prevent an identity from denying previous actions
2There are two categories of key-based cryptographic algorithms: symmetric algorithms
and asymmetric algorithms. The same secret key is used to encrypt and decrypt the
information in symmetric algorithms, as Figure 1.1 shows.
Encryption Decryption
Plaintext Ciphertext Original plaintext
Secret key
Figure 1.1: Encryption and Decryption with One Secret Key
In asymmetric algorithms, however, two different keys (namely, public key and private
key) are used to encrypt and decrypt information, as shown in Figure 2.2.
Encryption Decryption
Plaintext Ciphertext Original plaintext
Public key Private key
Figure 1.2: Encryption and Decryption with Two Different Keys [54]
As the same (secret) key is used for encryption and decryption in symmetric cryptosys-
tems, it is necessary to transfer the secret key among all communicating parties before
secure communication begins. Prior to the birth of asymmetric cryptosystems (also
called public-key cryptosystems), the exchange of the secret keys has always been a
difficult problem because of the need for a confidential channel. In addition, for each
pair of communicating parties, a different pair of the secret keys need to be generated
and shared, so the management of the secret keys had also been an issue.
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [12] were the first researchers in the public area to become
aware of public key cryptosystems. In public-key cryptosystems, an important advan-
tage over symmetric cryptosystems is that key exchange can occur without the need
for a secure channel [38]. As Diffie and Hellman suggested, public key cryptosystems
are based on the one-way trapdoor functions, which means it is significantly easier to
3compute in the forward direction than in the inverse direction. However, the inverse
direction is easy given a certain piece of trapdoor information [12].
In public-key cryptosystems, an enciphering key (often called public key) can be made
public, and a deciphering key (often called private key) is kept secret by the owner.
Thus everyone can use the intended receiver’s public key to encrypt the message, and
send the ciphertext to the receiver. Only the receiver can use his/her own private
key to decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the original message. The encryption and
decryption processes can be simply denoted as follows:
Epk(M) = C
Dsk(C) = Dsk(Epk(M)) =M
Here M denotes the original message, and C denotes the ciphertext which is sent over
the insecure channel. The subscripts pk and sk respectively denote the public key and
the private key. The functions E and D respectively represent the encryption and
decryption functions. And they satisfy the following properties:
1. Given the information sk and pk respectively to the functions D and E, it is
easy to compute the functions Dsk and Epk.
2. For each private key sk and its corresponding public key pk, the one way function
Epk is the inverse of the function Dsk.
3. It is computationally infeasible to compute the functionD without the knowledge
of sk. Moreover, it is also computationally infeasible to derive any knowledge
about sk from the public function Epk and public key pk.
Since the concept of public key cryptosystem was proposed by Diffie and Hellman,
there have been several concrete systems. They are classified into three categories
according to their reliance on different mathematical problems.
The first one is based on the difficulty of the integer factorization problem. The RSA
cryptosystem [52] and the Rabin cryptosystem are two famous representatives in this
4category. The former is a most widely used cryptosystem, while the latter is the first
cryptosystem whose security has been mathematically proven to be equivalent to the
difficulty of factoring. In a later chapter we will discuss further the latter representative.
The second category is based on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem. A
typical cryptosystem is the ElGamal cryptosystem [13].
The third category is based on the knapsack problem, which is an NP-complete prob-
lem. The cryptosystem was proposed by Merkle and Hellman, and was called the
Merkle-Hellman Knapsack cryptosystem [42].
The first two categories survived existing crypto attacks, and are said to be safe for
practical use. However, the Merkle-Hellman Knapsack Cryptosystem and its many
variants were broken by Shamir’s algorithm [57], and later by LLL algorithm by Lenstra
et. al. [35]. Thus there has been no attempt to use a cryptosystem in the third category
to date. However, the Merkle-Hellman Knapsack cryptosystem has the attractive
feature that it operates at the high speeds [47]. It can process more than 100 times
faster than RSA (with the modulus of about 500 bits), whether hardware or software
implementations are used, and thus can rival classical secret key systems in speed [52].
In order to take advantage of its speed, and revive a cryptosystem in the third category
that can be used for practical use, Akito Kiriyama [25] recently proposed a new public
key cryptosystem based on the non-linear knapsack problem, which is known to be
an NP-complete problem. The non-linear property in his scheme can resist existing
attacks to the linear knapsack cryptosystems and their variants. Based on his work,
we further extend the non-linear knapsack cryptosystem in several ways.
1.2 Research Objectives
By combining the non-linear property of a non-linear knapsack cryptosystem with other
mathematical concepts, the following objectives are achieved through our researches:
1. We propose a scheme, called an encrypted (n, n) threshold secret sharing scheme,
which combines the concept of the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) and the
5non-linear knapsack scheme with the concept of secret sharing. The biggest
advantage of our scheme over other secret sharing schemes would be that we
increase the security of shares against outsiders. Simply speaking, it would be
hard for outsiders to recover the secret even if they could collect n shares, because
those shares are encrypted at the same time they are generated.
2. We propose a multiple identities authentication scheme that can be used for
access control. Simply speaking, several identities of one entity can be verified in
one execution of our scheme. In addition, due to low computational complexity
of our scheme, it can be used in resource-constrained devices for access control.
We evaluate the security and performance of each of our schemes. In addition, we
implement each one in the C language under the Linux platforms. The experimental
results show our schemes are very efficient. More importantly, the non-linear knapsack
scheme is far more efficient than the RSA encryption/decryption scheme, due to the
low computational complexity of the non-linear knapsack problem.
1.3 Thesis Structure
Chapter 2 in this thesis introduces all related background theories, including the de-
velopment of cryptography in section 2.1, the mathematical problems of two categories
of cryptographic schemes and their typical representatives, which are the integer fac-
torization problem and the Rabin and the RSA Cryptosystems in section 2.2, and the
discrete logarithm problem and the ElGamal Cryptosystem in section 2.3, respectively.
In chapter 3, we start with a general overview of the mathematical foundation of the
knapsack problem. We cover the theory of NP-completeness in section 3.2, followed by
an overview of the Merkle-Hellman Knapsack cryptosystem in section 3.3. Shamir’s
method for attacking to the Merkle-Hellman Knapsack cryptosystem is briefly ex-
plained in section 3.4. The foundation of our research work, Kiriyama’s non-linear
knapsack cryptosystem, is presented in section 3.5, and the evaluation of his scheme is
given in section 3.6. Finally, we summarize the whole chapter in section 3.7.
6From chapter 4, we start to present all of our research work. We start with the
introduction of an encrypted (n, n) threshold secret sharing scheme. Firstly, the general
overview of Shamir’s and Blakley’s secret sharing schemes are given in section 4.2.
Then our scheme is illustrated in section 4.3, followed by the analysis of security of
our scheme in section 4.4. Finally, a conclusion is given in section 4.5.
Chapter 5 illustrates our multiple identities authentication scheme used for access
control. In section 5.2 related work is discussed, which includes the overview of three
ways to implement the access control systems. Then our scheme will be discussed
in detail in section 5.3, namely the description of the algorithm and its proof. After
that the evaluation is presented in section 5.4, focused on the efficiency and security
analysis and comparisons, followed by possible applications of our scheme in section
5.5. A summary is given in section 5.6.
Finally conclusions are presented and future work is discussed in Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Introduction of Cryptography
The word Cryptology (stems from Greek roots) means “hidden” and “word”, and
is an umbrella term used to describe the entire field of secret communications [39].
Cryptology consists of two parts, which are cryptography and cryptanalysis. The part
that deals with the design of algorithms, protocols, and systems which are used to
protect information against specific threats, is called cryptography [50]. The other
part that uses mathematical methods to prove that the design (an implementation of
information protection) does not achieve a security goal or that it cannot withstand
an attack from the list of threats given in the security specification of the design is
called cryptanalysis [50]. Persons who are engaged in research into the corresponding
part are respectively called cryptographers and cryptanalysts.
Simply speaking, cryptographers try to find methods to protect information, whereas
cryptanalysts try to find attacks to prove that the cryptographers’ designs are not
secure enough. Cryptographers and cryptanalysts are like players in a game of chess,
who compete with each other to become winners. Moreover, cryptographers have to
change their roles back and forth from the attackers to the defenders and back. Just like
in a game, the sequences of moves and counter-moves need to be considered carefully.
Additionally, cryptographers have to consider some situations, in which the opposite
8side may break rules or violate expectations. In a word, cryptography is a fascinating
discipline because of its game-like adversarial nature [41].
Now let us define several basic terms which are used throughout the whole chapter.
Sender and Receiver: A sender is a transmitter, who wants to send the message to
one or more recipients. The intended recipient(s) is(are) called the receiver(s).
Only the receiver can read the message from the sender. To an interceptor, the
message looks like garbage.
Plaintext and Ciphertext: An original message is called a plaintext, which is read-
able for anyone. Through some transformations, a plaintext is converted into
unreadable form, which is called a ciphertext or cryptogram.
Encryption and Decryption: The process of converting the plaintext into cipher-
text is called encryption. And the inverse process, recovering the ciphertext to
the original plaintext is called decryption.
Cryptographic algorithm and Key: The step-by-step descriptions of encryption
and decryption processes are called cryptographic algorithms (also called ciphers)
[41]. Usually, cryptographic algorithms are mathematical functions. And the
operations of those functions are controlled by a key, which is a secret piece of
information that customizes how the ciphertext is produced.
Cryptosystem: A set of cryptographic primitives such as cryptographic algorithms,
keys, and any actions defined by the users and so on implemented together as a
system constitutes a cryptosystem [41].
In the next section, we will introduce several earliest forms of ciphers: transposition,
substitution ciphers (Caesar cipher) and one-time pad. They are all important contri-
butions to the development of the history of cryptography before 1970s.
92.2 Introduction of Several Ciphers
Cryptography has a long and colorful history, which dates back to thousands of years.
The earliest forms of hiding information can be divided into two categories, namely
transposition and substitution. Transposition is to rearrange the order of letters in a
message. Figure 2.1 [54] shows a simple example of how to use transposition to hide
the content of a message.
Ciphertext: CAELP OPSEE MHLAN PIOSS UCWTI TSBIV EMUTE RATSG YAERB TX.
   Plaintext: COMPUTER GRAPHICS MAY BE SLOW BUT AT LEAST IT’S EXPENSIVE.
C  O  M  P  U  T  E  R  G  R
A  P   H   I  C  S  M A  Y  B
E  S   L   O W B  U  T  A  T
L  E   A   S  T  I   T   S  E  X
P  E   N   S   I  V  E
Figure 2.1: A Simple Example of Using Transposition
As we can see from figure 2.1, the plaintext is written horizontally onto a piece of
graph paper of fixed width and the ciphertext is read off vertically [54]. To recover
the original message, one needs to put the ciphertext vertically onto a piece of paper
of exactly identical width, then read the plaintext horizontally.
The second category, substitution means that each letter in a plaintext is substituted
for another letter to form the ciphertext [54]. One of the earliest and simplest substitu-
tion ciphers is the Caesar cipher used by Julius Caesar, who wrote the letters to Cicero
and his other friends. Each letter in the plaintext is replaced by the third (cyclically)
later letter in the Latin alphabet [23]. Today, we could express Caesar cipher as the
following way [39]:
y = x⊕ z
where x represents each letter in the plaintext, z represents how far each letter in the
plaintext shifts cyclically to later letter, and y represents the letter in the ciphertext.
Here ⊕ denotes addition modulo 26 (the total number of English characters).
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Obviously, the length of the plaintext is the same as that of the ciphertext in those
two categories mentioned above. A frequency analysis on the ciphertext would give a
good hint to cryptanalysts. Detailed cryptanalysis is discussed in [60, 15].
In 1917, Major Joseph Mauborgne and AT&T’s Gilbert Vername [23] invented an
unbreakable encryption scheme, which is called a one-time pad. Specifically, the sender
generates a large non-repeating set of random letters, which are used as one-time pads.
Then encryption is the addition modulo 26 of each letter in the plaintext and each
letter in the one-time pads. Note, as the name of the scheme suggests, each letter in
the pads is used only once for one message. The following small example (drawn from
[54]) illustrates the idea of this scheme:
Here is the plaintext: ONE TIME PAD
And the sequence of the pads is: TBFRGFARFM
Then the ciphertext is: IPKLPSFHGQ, which is produced as follows:
Q+ T (mod 26) = I
N +B (mod 26) = P
E + F (mod 26) = K
...
D +M (mod 26) = Q
Since each letter in the pads is randomly generated, it has the same probability for
each letter to appear in the pads. That is to say, the cryptanalysts have no way
to determine which letter could be a key letter used to encrypt the plaintext. The
inventors believe that their method, one-time pad is unbreakable, but they do not give
any proofs. In 1949, C. E. Shannon published his paper “Communication Theory of
Secrecy Systems [58]”, in which he not only proves the unbreakability of one-time pad,
but also establishes sharp bounds on the required amount of secret keys that must be
transferred securely to the intended recipients when any perfect cipher is used [39].
11
Shannon’s great work did not bring an explosion of research into cryptography. How-
ever, this did occur when the paper “New Direction in Cryptography [12]” was pub-
lished by Diffie and Hellman in 1976. They established the concepts of public key
cryptography that continue to be used today [39].
So far, we have introduced several ciphers, which are important to the development
of the history of cryptography before 1970s. For those readers who are interested in
detail, Kahn’s book “The Codebreakers [23]”, from the non-technical point of view,
gives an interesting introduction. This book traces the history of cryptography from
the ancient time (about 4000 years ago) to the twentieth century.
Two important advances were made in 1970s, the publication of Data Encryption Stan-
dard (DES) [45], and the development of public key cryptosystems, proposed by Diffie
and Hellman. Since then cryptographic algorithms are considered to fall into two cat-
egories, namely symmetric cryptographic algorithms, and asymmetric cryptographic
algorithms (also called public-key cryptographic algorithms). Section 2.3 presents the
first category, including its typical cryptosystems DES and AES [10] (Advanced En-
cryption Standard, which replaces DES as a new standard in 2001).
After that two typical public key cryptosystems and their mathematical foundations
are illustrated in detail in section 2.4, namely, the Rabin public key cryptosystem
and ElGamal cryptosystem, together with their respective mathematical foundations,
which are the integer factorization problem and the discrete logarithm problem. In
section 2.5, we briefly introduce several basic types of cryptanalytic attacks, and then
introduce some attacks on the RSA cryptosystem. Finally a conclusion is given in
section 2.6.
2.3 Symmetric Cryptosystems
Generally speaking, in symmetric cryptographic algorithms, the same key is used for
encryption and decryption. Thus the security of symmetric cryptosystems totally relies
on the security of the keys. That is to say, if the keys are revealed to those unintended
12
recipients, the whole cryptosystem is broken. The encryption and decryption functions
can be denoted by:
Ek(M) = C
Dk(C) = Dk(Ek(M)) =M
Here M denotes the plaintext, and C denotes the ciphertext. The functions E and D
respectively represent the encryption and decryption functions. k denotes the key for
the encryption and decryption. Figure 2.2 describes a two-party communication by
using the symmetric cryptosystem.
Key Source
Encryption
Source
Plaintext
Decryption
D (C) = M
Destination
Ciphertetx: C
unsecure channel
Private key: k
Adversary
Party A Party B
Plaintext: M
E (M) = C
secure channel
k k
Figure 2.2: Two-Party Communications by Using Symmetric Cryptosystems [41]
As we can see from the above figure, if the key is securely exchanged between two
parties (party A as a sender and party B as a receiver) before communication happens,
the adversary can not decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the original message.
DES (Data Encryption Standard) is such a typical symmetric algorithm, which has
been used as a standard since 1975. Initially the NBS (National Bureau of Standards
13
in USA), now the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) initiated a
program to develop a standard cryptographic algorithm, in order to protect computers
and communication data for businesses such as banks and other large financial organi-
zations [54]. IBM submitted a promising algorithm as a candidate. After modifications
by the NBS, this algorithm was published in 1975. In the following year this algorithm
was adopted as a federal standard (called DES) on November 23, 1976 and authorized
for use on all unclassified government communications [6].
Simply speaking, DES is a block cipher, which means the plaintext is grouped into
fixed size blocks of bits to be encrypted. In other words, DES encrypts the plaintext in
64-bit blocks to produce the ciphertext in 64-bit blocks. The length of the key in DES
is 64 bits, but only 56 bits are used by the algorithm for encryption and decryption,
while 8 bits are used for checking parity. The overall structure of DES algorithm is
shown in Figure 2.3.
Generally speaking, the plaintext goes in from one end, and then through 16 identical
stages of operations (known as rounds), the ciphertext comes out of the other end.
Firstly, a 64-bit block of the plaintext is broken into two halves after initial permu-
tation, which are 32 bits for each. Then the keys and the right part are fed into a
function F as the input. Through some transformations of F , the result is combined
with the left part via an XOR. Thus the new result becomes the right part for the next
round. The old right part becomes the new left part. After repeating those operations
16 times, the final left and right parts are joined together to construct a new 64-bit
block. Applying the inverse of initial permutation to this block, a block of the cipher-
text is produced. The same algorithm and the keys are applied to the decryption to
recover the original message.
The actions of the function F are shown in Figure 2.4.
14
Plaintext
Initial Permutation
F K1
F K2
R1= L0        F(R0, K1)
R2= L1        F(R1, K2)
L15 = R14
F K16
L16 = R15R16= L15      F(R15, K16)
Inverse Initial Permutation
Ciphertext
L0 R0
L1 = R0
L2 = R1
R15= L14      F(R14, K15)
Figure 2.3: The Overall Structure of DES [54]
15
R
Substitution
Permutation
Key K
Expansion
ii−1
Figure 2.4: The Actions of the Function F [41, 54]
Here the symbols E, S, and P are respectively represented as the operations Expansion,
Substitution, and Permutation. The function F can be denoted by
F (Ri−1, Ki) = P (S(E(Ri−1)⊕Ki)).
Unfortunately, the DES key size has been shown to be insufficient to protect against
the brute force attacks, which have been shown to succeed in 56 hours [18]). This
means the attackers can test all possible keys through the key space to find the correct
one to recover the original plaintext. In other words, the attackers would find the
correct key, after on average 263 trials, when the key size is 64 bits. As a result, DES
is not secure for use nowadays.
In 2001, AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) was adopted by NIST (National Insti-
tute if Standards and Technology) to replace DES as a new standard. AES is a block
cipher as well. It has a fixed block size of 128 bits, and its key size could be 128, 192,
or even 256 bits. Thus an attack against 128-bit key requires on average 2127 trials,
which takes unreasonable amount of time. Moreover, AES is fast in both software and
hardware, and it is easy to implement. AES as a new encryption standard is currently
being adopted on a large scale.
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2.4 Public Key Cryptosystems and Their Mathe-
matical Foundations
As we mentioned before, it is necessary in symmetric cryptosystems to transfer secret
keys among communicating parties before communication begins. Moreover, keys must
be exchanged in a secure way, otherwise, if secret keys are revealed to attackers, the
whole cryptosystem would be broken. On the other hand, different pairs of secret keys
need to be generated and shared by different pairs of communicating parties. Thus the
management of secret keys has been a big issue as well.
An important advantage of public key cryptosystems over symmetric cryptosystems is
that key exchange can take place without the need of secure channel [38]. In public key
cryptosystems, there are two keys used for each user, a public key and a private key,
with the public key for encryption and the private key for decryption. The public key
can be sent over an insecure channel. Anyone can use the intended recipient’s public
key to encrypt the message to produce the ciphertext. Only the intended recipient can
use his/her own private key to decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the original message.
Anyone else who does not know the private key can not recover the message.
In public key cryptosystems, the private key is always linked to the public key in a
mathematical way. Moreover, it has to be computationally infeasible to derive any
knowledge about the private key from the public key. Since the concept of public key
cryptosystems was proposed by Diffie and Hellman, there have been several public key
systems proposed. They are classified into three categories according to their links to
the different mathematical problems.
The first one is based on the difficulty of integer factorization. The RSA cryptosystem
and the Rabin cryptosystem are two famous representatives in this category. The
former is a widely used system. The latter is the first public key cryptosystem whose
security has been proven mathematically. Breaking the Rabin cryptosystem is provably
equivalent to factoring. We would put emphasis on introducing the Rabin cryptosystem
and its mathematical foundation in section 2.4.1.
The second category is based on the difficulty of discrete logarithm. A typical cryp-
17
tosystem is the ElGamal cryptosystem. In section 2.4.2, the ElGamal cryptosystem
and the discrete logarithm problem will be described.
The third category is based on the knapsack problem, which is an NP-complete prob-
lem. A cryptosystem was proposed by Merkle and Hellman. In chapter 3, we introduce
it in detail.
2.4.1 The Rabin cryptosystem and the integer factorization
problem
As previously noted, the RSA cryptosystem is a widely used cryptosystem based on
the integer factorization problem. The encryption and decryption methods of the RSA
system are as follows:
Randomly generate two prime numbers p and q with roughly the same size, and let
the product of p and q be n. Represent the message M as an integer between 0 and
n− 1. Then randomly choose the encryption key e such that e and (p− 1)(q − 1) are
relatively prime. Compute the decryption key d such that ed ≡ 1 (mod (p− 1)(q− 1)).
The numbers e and n are public keys. The numbers d, p and q are private keys.
The processes of encryption and decryption are simple. The sender obtains the public
keys and then computes the ciphertext C by C =M e (modn).
The decryption is an inverse process of encryption. The receiver uses his/her private
key to recover the original plaintext by M = Cd (modn).
The security of the RSA scheme rests on the fact that breaking this system is at least
as difficult as factoring the product n. To date, nobody has not found any algorithm
to solve the factorization problem in a reasonable amount of time.
Another cryptosystem based on the same mathematical problem has a stronger the-
oretic foundation. The Rabin cryptosystem is also a public key system, which was
proposed in 1979 by Rabin [41]. Like RSA, the Rabin cryptosystem is based on the
difficulty of integer factorization. However, the Rabin cryptosystem is the first public
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key cryptosystem, for which it has been proven that the ability to decrypt messages
is equivalent to the ability to factor large numbers [51]. That is to say, as long as
it is impossible in practice to factor large numbers, it will be impossible to decrypt
messages [51].
The following illustrates the Rabin cryptographic algorithm with a small example.
Then its underlying mathematical problem is given.
parameters:
p, q : Let p and q be two prime numbers with roughly the same size. In order to simplify
the computation of square roots modulo p and q (see below), p and q are both chosen
to be p ≡ q ≡ 3 (mod 4). We can also choose p ≡ q ≡ 1 (mod 4).
n : Let n be the product of prime numbers p and q.
private key:
The prime numbers p and q are both the private key.
public key:
The product n of p and q is the public key.
encryption:
The encryption process is a simple process as follows:
1. The sender represents the message as an integer m in the range {0, 1, ..., n− 1}
2. The sender computes the ciphertext c = m2 (modn)
3. The ciphertext c is sent to the receiver
decryption:
The following part illustrates the decryption process:
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1. The receiver first computes the square roots of c modulo the primes p and q,
which are denoted by
mp = c
1/2 (mod p)
and
mq = c
1/2 (mod q)
Since the receiver knows the factorization of n, and p+1 and q+1 are a multiple
of 4, the computations of mp and mq are described as follows:
mp = c
(p+1)/4 (mod p)
and
mq = c
(q+1)/4 (mod q)
In fact, the first congruence has two possible solutions ±mp and so does the
second. That is to say, the original message could be constructed by one of
four pairs of possible solutions, which are (mp,mq), (mp,−mq), (−mp,mq), and
(−mp,−mq), respectively. To avoid ambiguity to decide which pair is the correct
one to construct the original message, the pre-specified redundancy to the original
message such as attaching some bits to the end of the plaintext is always used,
prior to encryption.
2. Then the receiver uses the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT. Its definition is
given in section 4.3) to compute the original message by
m = (mpqq
−1 +mqpp−1) (modn)
m = (mpqq
−1 + (−mq)pp−1) (modn)
m = ((−mp)qq−1 +mqpp−1) (modn)
m = ((−mp)qq−1 + (−mq)pp−1) (modn)
With high probability, one message would present the required redundancy.
Thus, the receiver can determine the original message.
proof:
Firstly we define several terms, which are used in the following proof. Definitions are
drawn from [41].
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Zn : The integers modulo n is denoted by Zn, which is the set of integers {0, 1, 2, ..., n−
1}.
Z∗n : The multiplicative group of Zn is Z
∗
n = {a ∈ Zn} | gcd(a, n) = 1}. In particular,
if n is a prime number, then Z∗n = {a | 1 ≤ a ≤ n− 1}.
quadratic residue modulo n: Let a ∈ Z∗n, a is said to be a quadratic residue modulo
n, if there exists an x ∈ Z∗n such that x2 ≡ a (modn). The Legendre symbol
L(a, n) is 1 if a is a quadratic residue modulo a prime number n.
The ciphertext c is a quadratic residue ofmmod p, and thus Legendre symbol L(c, p) =
c(p−1)/2 (mod p) = 1 (mod p) = 1. In addition, mp and mq are computed by mp =
c(p+1)/4 (mod p), and mq = c
(q+1)/4 (mod q), since p + 1 and q + 1 are a multiple of 4.
Then,
m2p ≡ c(p+1)/2 ≡ c(p−1)/2c ≡ c (mod p)
Note that −mp also satisfies the above equation. ±mq can be computed in the same
way.
example:
Let the private keys p and q be 7 and 11, and thus the public key n is 77. The sender
takes m = 11 as the plaintext. In order to avoid the ambiguity, the sender attaches
two bits “01” to the end of the original message. Thus m is 45 as the original message.
The sender computes the ciphertext c = m2 (modn) = 452 (mod 77) = 23, and sends c
to the receiver.
As the receiver knows the private keys p and q, the square roots mp and mq are
computed by mp = c
(p+1)/4 (mod p) = 4, and mq = c
(q+1)/4 (mod q) = 1. Thus four
solutions are produced, which are (4, 1), (−4, 1), (4,−1), and (−4,−1) respectively.
Applying the Chinese Remainder Theorem to the above solutions, the receiver obtains
four possible values of the original message, namely 67, 32, 45, and 10. Then the
receiver represents them as the binary form. Only the value 45 satisfies the required
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redundancy. Thus the receiver decrypts the ciphertext c to 45, and then recovers the
original message m = 11.
underlying mathematical foundation:
As we mentioned before, the security of the Rabin cryptosystem relies on the integer
factorization problem. That is to say, the problem faced to the attackers who try to
recover the original plaintext from some given ciphertext is computationally equivalent
to factoring [41].
Specifically speaking, the integer factorization problem is defined as follows [41]:
Given a positive integer n, find its prime factorization; that is to write
n = pe11 p
e2
2 ...p
ek
k where the pi are pairwise distinct primes and each ei ≥ 1.
For example, an integer 21 can be split into two prime numbers 3 and 7. It is easy to
multiply those prime numbers together to get an integer. However, factoring an integer
is not an easy job, especially when the multiplier (prime numbers) are big numbers for
instance 100 (or more) decimal digits.
Knuth [27] gives an excellent presentation of many factoring algorithms. So far, if
a big number is the product of two primes with roughly the same size, there are no
known algorithms that can factor this big number in polynomial time. The recent
news from the RSA Laboratories reports that a team at the German Federal Agency
for Information Technology Security successfully factors a 640-bit number (about 200
decimal digits). This effort takes them approximately 30 2.2GHz-Opteron-CPU years
over five months of calendar time [53]. Therefore, factoring a number is regarded as
a difficult problem, and the security of several public key cryptosystems such as the
Rabin cryptosystem and the RSA cryptosystem both depend on the difficulty of integer
factorization.
Compared with other cryptosystems whose security is based on the difficulty of integer
factorization, for example the RSA cryptosystem, the Rabin cryptosystem is the first
one to be proven that breaking it is as difficult as factoring. The following part gives
the proof.
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Theorem: If there is a polynomial time algorithm F that can compute the plaintext
m from the ciphertext c with some positive probability, we can construct an al-
gorithm that factors the modulo n into two prime factors p and q in polynomially
expected time.
Proof: Pick up a random number x in Zn as the original message. Then compute
y = x2 (modn) and input (x, n) into the algorithm F . Then the algorithm F will
return x∗ = y1/2 (modn) which is one of four possible values which may be used
to construct the original message.
As x is chosen randomly, we will have prob(x = x∗) = prob(x∗ = −x) = 1/4,
which means the probability that the random number x is the same as the plain-
text is one-fourth. On average, we can hit the event x 6= x∗ or x 6= −x∗ at two
trials. In this case, we have gcd(x − x∗, n) = p or gcd(x∗ − x, n) = q. That is
to say, we would obtain one of the prime factors of n by computing the value of
gcd(x− x∗, n) or gcd(x∗ − x, n).
Since gcd is a polynomial time algorithm, we can factor n in a polynomial ex-
pected time.
Obviously, the conclusion of the above theorem contradicts the fact that there are no
known algorithms that can factor a big number in polynomial time. Thus it in turn
proves the security of the Rabin cryptosystem. That is to say, as long as it is impossible
in practice to factor a large number in polynomial time, it will be impossible to recover
the original plaintext from the ciphertext without knowing the private key.
2.4.2 The ElGamal cryptosystem and the discrete logarithm
problem
The ElGamal cryptosystem [13] is a public key system, which was proposed by ElGamal
in 1985. Its security is based on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem.
That is to say, if the discrete logarithm problem could be solved efficiently, then the
ElGamal system could be broken.
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Firstly we will define some related mathematical terms. All definitions are drawn from
[41, 54, 50]. The ElGamal system is described, followed by a small example and the
proof of this system. Finally the underlying mathematical foundation, which is the
discrete logarithm problem, is given.
Group G: A group G = (S, ∗) is an algebraic structure that satisfies the following
conditions (∗ denotes a binary operation on S ):
1. For any two elements a, b ∈ S, c = a ∗ b ∈ S. This property is called closure.
2. The group operation is associative. That is, a ∗ (b ∗ c) = (a ∗ b) ∗ c for all a, b, c
∈ S
3. There is an element 1 ∈ S, called the identity element, such that a∗1 = 1∗a = a
for a ∈ S
4. For each a ∈ S there exists an element a−1 ∈ S, called the inverse of a, such
that a ∗ a−1 = a−1 ∗ a = 1
5. For any two a, b ∈ S, a ∗ b = b ∗ a, this group is called the commutative group.
Finite Group: A group G is finite if |G| is finite. |G| denotes the number of elements
in G.
Order: The number of elements in a finite group G is called its order. The order of
a, (a ∈ G), is defined to be the least positive integer t such that at = 1, provided
that such an integer exists. If such a t does not exist, then the order of a is
defined to be ∞.
Subgroup: A non-empty subset H of a group G is a subgroup of G if H is itself
a group with respect to the operation of G. If G is a finite group and H is a
subgroup of G, then |H| divides |G|. Hence, if a ∈ G, the order of a divides |G|.
This fact is called Lagrange Theorem.
Cyclic Group: A group G is cyclic if there is an element α ∈ G such that for each
b ∈ G there is an integer i with b = αi. Such an element α is called a generator
of G.
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A Generator of Z∗n: Let α ∈ Z∗n. (Z∗n is called the multiplicative group of Zn. The
definitions of Zn and Z
∗
n are given in the preceding section.) If the order of α
is φ(n), then α is said to be a generator of Z∗n (α does not always exist.). φ(n)
denotes the number of integers in the interval [1, n] which are relatively prime to
n, for n ≥ 1. The function φ is called the Euler phi function.
We can now start to describe the ElGamal cryptosystem using a small example. The
proof of the system and its mathematical foundation are given later.
parameters:
p : Let p be a large prime number
g : Let g be a generator of the multiplicative group Z∗p of integers modulo p. For prime
number p, g exists.
x : Let x be a random number, such that 1 ≤ x ≤ p− 2
private key:
The random number x is a private key
public key:
The prime number p, the generator g, and the value y = gx (mod p) are the public
keys.
finding a generator g of Z∗p:
An efficient way to produce the generator g of the multiplicative group Z∗p of integers
modulo p is described as follows:
1. Select a random large prime number q, and then check if p = 2q + 1 is a prime
number by using Solovay-Strassen probabilistic primality test [3, 61]. Actually,
the probability that a randomly selected element g ∈ Z∗p is a generator is q−12q ≈ 12 .
25
proof : From the preceding definitions, we know the order of a multiplicative
group Z∗p is p− 1, and according to the properties of generators of Z∗p, the num-
ber of generators is φ(φ(p)) = φ(p − 1) = φ(2q) = φ(2)φ(q) = q − 1, if Z∗p is a
cyclic.
In addition the probability of a random element in Z∗p being a generator is de-
noted by φ(n)
n
, (n denotes the order of a cyclic group.).
Thus, the probability is computed by φ(n)
n
= φ(p−1)
p−1 ≈ q−12q ≈ 12 .
2. Select a random element g ∈ Z∗p such that g 6= 1, then do:
for i from 1 to 2
{
compute b = gq (mod p);
if b = 1 then go to the step 2;
compute b = g2 (mod p);
if b = 1 then go to the step 2;
}
return g;
encryption:
The encryption process works in the following way:
1. The sender represents the message as an integer m in the range {0, 1, ..., p− 1}.
2. The sender randomly selects an integer k, such that 1 ≤ k ≤ p− 2.
3. The sender computes a pair of ciphertext a = gk (mod p), and b = m∗yk (mod p).
4. A pair of ciphertext (a, b) is sent to the receiver.
decryption:
The decryption is a simple process as follows:
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1. The receiver computes (ax)−1 (mod p) by using his/her own private key x.
2. Then the receiver recovers the original plaintextm by computing b∗(ax)−1 (mod p).
proof:
Since b = m ∗ yk (mod p), and y = gx (mod p), b can be expressed as b = m ∗
(gx)k (mod p). In addition, a = gk (mod p).
Thus the recovery of the plaintext can be expressed by
b ∗ (ax)−1 ≡ (m ∗ (gx)k) ∗ (gkx)−1 ≡ m ∗ gxk ∗ g−xk ≡ m (mod p)
example (drawn from [41]):
Suppose that the generation of the parameters is as follows:
Selects the prime p = 2357, and compute a generator g = 2 of Z∗2357. Then randomly
generate the private key x = 1751 and compute the public key by
y = gx (mod p) = 21751 (mod 2357) = 1185
To encrypt a message, the sender represents the message as an integer m = 2035, then
the sender selects a random integer k = 1520 and computes a pair of ciphertext a and
b by
a = gk (mod p) = 21520 (mod 2357) = 1430
b = ykm (mod p) = 11851520 ∗ 2035 (mod 2357) = 697
A pair of ciphertext (a, b) = (1430, 697) is sent to the receiver.
The receiver computes
(ax)−1 ∗ b (mod p) = (14301751)−1 ∗ 697 (mod 2357) = 2035
Thus, the original plaintext is successfully recovered by the receiver.
underlying mathematical foundation:
Generally speaking, the discrete logarithm is the inverse of the discrete exponentiation
in a finite cyclic group [62]. Its definition is given as follows [62]:
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Discrete Logarithm: Given a cyclic group G of order n with group operation × and
a generator g, exponentiation in G is defined by [62]:
gx =
x terms︷ ︸︸ ︷
g × g × ...× g
Suppose y = gx, then the discrete logarithm of y to the base g is the integer x,
and is denoted
x = loggy
Discrete Logarithm Problem: Given a cyclic group G of order n, a generator g in
G, and an element y ∈ G, find an integer x such that gx = y [41].
The integer x is unique because it can only be found modulo the order n in G. For
example, let p = 97 and a generator g = 5. Then Z∗97 is a cyclic group of order
n = p− 1 = 96. Since 532 ≡ 35 (mod 97), the discrete logarithm of 35 to the base 5 is
denoted by log535 = 32 in Z
∗
97 .
Modular exponentiation within a group is easy to perform. That is to say, if we obtain
the values of the generator g, the integer x and the modulo n, it is easy to compute the
value of y by the well-known “square-and-multiply” method. The complexity of bit
operations in a cyclic group Z∗n is O((lgn)
3). Knuth [29] gives the detailed discussion
about this method.
However, discrete logarithm is much harder to compute than modular exponentiation.
So far, all known methods to compute discrete logarithm in a cyclic group require
exponential time. Therefore, the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem is
regarded as the foundation for the security of a class of cryptosystems for example the
ElGamal cryptosystem. For those readers who are interested in the discrete logarithm
problem, please see the references [40, 46, 48].
2.4.3 The integer factorization problem and the discrete log-
arithm problem
Many algorithms for computing discrete logarithms are analogous to integer factor-
ization algorithms. LaMacchia and Odlyzko [34] notes that if the modulo is a prime
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number, then the complexity of finding discrete logarithm in cyclic group G is essen-
tially the same as factoring an integer n of about the same size, where n is the product
of two approximately equal-length primes. In other words, suppose that n is a compos-
ite integer, if the discrete logarithm problem in Z∗n can be solved in polynomial time,
then n can be factored in expected polynomial time [41].
So far, the security of the cryptosystems such as the Rabin cryptosystem and the
ElGamal cryptosystem are respectively based on the intractability of the integer fac-
torization problem and the discrete logarithm problem. It is widely believed that both
mathematical problems are hard to solve in polynomial time, because nobody has
found efficient algorithms to solve them in expected polynomial time so far. However,
in the future, if unexpected new mathematical algorithms are found, they would poten-
tially solve both the integer factorization problem and the discrete logarithm problem
[49], which in turn destroy the security of those cryptosystems based on those two
mathematical problems.
2.5 Cryptanalysis
As we mentioned in section 2.1, cryptology consists of two parts: cryptography and
cryptanalysis. The former is to deal with the design of algorithms, protocols, and
systems which are used to protect information against specific threats. The latter is
to use mathematical methods to prove that the design does not achieve a security goal
or that it cannot withstand an attack from the list of threats given in the security
specification of the design.
The general definitions for each of several basic types of cryptanalytic attacks are given
as follows:
1. Ciphertext-only attack. As it name indicates, the cryptanalyst only has the
ciphertexts of several messages, all of which have been encrypted using the same
encryption algorithm [54]. By observing the ciphertexts, the cryptanalyst tries
to recover the messages as many as possible, or even to deduce the key used to
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encrypt the messages. In the history of cryptography, statistical techniques such
as frequency analysis were developed for the ciphertext-only attack. Early cipher
implemented using pen-and-paper could be broken by this method [11].
2. Known-plaintext attack. The cryptanalyst not only has the ciphertexts, but also
has the corresponding plaintext to those ciphertexts. If the cryptanalyst is able
to deduce the key used to encrypt the plaintexts, the attack would be successful.
Classical ciphers are typically vulnerable to known-plaintext attack [11]. As
we mentioned in section 2.2, a Caesar cipher could be broken by a frequency
analysis on the ciphertext and corresponding plaintext, and exhaustive search
for the small key space (there are only 26 keys/English characters in the Caesar
cipher).
3. Chosen-plaintext attack. A chosen-plaintext attack is a model in which cryptan-
alyst has capability to choose arbitrary plaintexts to be encrypted and obtain the
corresponding ciphertexts [64]. This attack model becomes quite important in
the context of public key cryptography, because the encryption keys are public.
Attackers can encrypt any plaintexts that they want and then obtain the cipher-
texts. Generally speaking, any cipher that can prevent chosen-plaintext attacks
is then also guaranteed to be secure against known-plaintext and ciphertext-only
attacks [64].
4. Chosen-ciphertext attack. A chosen-ciphertetx attack is primarily applicable
to asymmetric cryptographic algorithms [54]. The cryptanalyst starts with the
ciphertexts to be decrypted with unknown keys, and then obtains the correspond-
ing decrypted plaintexts. Subsequently, the cryptanalyst tries to deduce more
information about the key.
5. Related-key attack. This is an attack model that the cryptanalyst observes some
ciphertexts encrypted under several keys. Then the mathematic relationship
connecting the keys might be known to the attackers [11]. For example, the
cryptanalyst may know the last bit of the keys is always the same, even though
the cryptanalyst still does not know the exact value of the keys.
The security of a cryptographic algorithm depends on how successful these types of
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attacks are. Take the cryptographic scheme RSA for example; since its initial publica-
tion, it has survived successfully over 20 years although its security has been analyzed
by many researchers. The most considered for RSA is the factoring of the public key.
So far it has not been proven that breaking the RSA algorithm is equivalent to factoring
a large number. However, it has not been proven either that it is not equivalent. More-
over, no polynomial-time algorithm for factoring large integers on a classical computer
has yet been found. The recent report from the RSA Lab reports that factoring 640-bit
number takes about 30 2.2GHz-Opteron-CPU years over five months of calendar time
[53].
There exists another possible attack by guessing the value (p − 1)(q − 1). However,
as the author in [64] points out that this attack is no easier than factoring n. Also in
[1], it shows that recovering even certain bits of information from an RSA-encrypted
ciphertext is as hard as decrypting the entire message [54].
On the other hand, there exist some attacks against the implementations of RSA. One
of the early weaknesses found was in a system where the users in a group share the
same public modulus n(= pq). However, the encryption key ei and the decryption key
di are different for each of the users. That is to say, the encrypted messages intended
for the user Alice can only be decrypted by Alice, because no one else except for Alice
knows the corresponding decryption key. This scheme seems to work well. However, as
Simmon shows in [19] this is incorrect and insecure, because another user Bob can use
his own exponent e and d to factor the modulus n. Once n is factored successfully, the
whole system is broken. Therefore, Simmon points out that an RSA modulus should
never be used by more than one entity.
Another attack on RSA’s implementation is caused by the use of small exponent en-
cryption key e. For the improvement of efficiency of encryption, it is desirable to select
a small encryption exponent e such as e = 3 [41]. Let us imagine the following scenario.
A sender Bob wants to send the encrypted message M to k (k ≥ e = 3) persons. Each
person has the same encryption exponent e(= 3) but different modulus ni. Suppose
that the message M is less than all modulus ni. Bob encrypts the message M by
using each person’s public keys (e, ni) and sends ciphertexts Ci =M
3 (modni) to each
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person. If an attacker could collect at least three ciphertexts Ci where
C1 =M
3 (modn1)
C2 =M
3 (modn2)
C3 =M
3 (modn3)
since these modulus are most likely pairwise relatively prime, by the Chinese Remainder
Theorem, it must be the case satisfying C ′ = M3 (modn1n2n3)(C ′ ∈ Zn1n2n3). As we
assumed above that the plaintext message is less than all ni, we have M < n1n2n3.
Thus the equation C ′ = M3 holds [5]. Hence, the attacker can recover the plaintext
by computing the integer cube root of C ′. The cryptosystem is broken when a small
encryption exponent is used.
As we mentioned in the beginning of this section, no successful attacks on RSA have
been found over 20 years, although its security has been analyzed by many cryptana-
lysts. The above attacks are only against the implementation of RSA, not against the
algorithm itself. Therefore, currently RSA is widely used and is believed to be secure
given sufficiently large modulus.
2.6 Conclusion
Cryptography has a long history, which traces back to thousands of years. The earliest
forms of ciphers are discussed in section 2.2, namely transposition cipher, substitution
cipher(Caesar cipher) and one-time pad.
With the publication of DES and the development of public key cryptosystem in 1970s,
cryptosystems became divided into two types of key-based algorithms, namely sym-
metric cryptographic algorithms and public key cryptographic algorithms. For the
former, the same key is used for encryption and decryption. It is discussed in section
2.3.
As for the latter, two different keys (private key and public key) are used. The public
key is used for encryption, which can be published openly. The private key is used
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for decryption, which has to be kept secret, known only to the owner of the key.
Thus, key distribution and key management are not significant issues for the public
key cryptosystems.
Generally speaking, public key cryptosystems can be classified into three categories
based on different mathematical foundations. One is based on the difficulty of integer
factorization. The typical systems are the Rabin cryptosystem and the RSA cryptosys-
tem. Because the Rabin cryptosystem is the first public key system whose security has
been mathematically proven to be equivalent to the difficulty of factoring, we put more
emphasis on introducing it and its mathematical foundation in section 2.4.1.
The cryptosystem of the second category is based on the discrete logarithm problem.
The typical cryptosystem in this category is the ElGamal system. We introduce this
system and the discrete logarithm problem in section 2.4.2. After that, in section 2.4.3,
we discuss the future of the above problems.
Definitions of basic types of attacks are briefly mentioned in section 2.5. Also several
specific attacks on the RSA cryptosystem are given in this section.
In the next chapter, we are going to describe the third category of cryptosystems and its
mathematical foundation in detail. A possible attack on the system is also mentioned.
Chapter 3
A Non-linear Knapsack Public Key
Scheme
3.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter, we discussed two categories of public key cryptosystems.
The first category is based on the difficulty of integer factorization. The typical cryp-
tosystems of the first category are the RSA system [52] and the Rabin system [51].
The second category is based on the difficulty of discrete logarithm. A typical cryp-
tosystem in this category is the ElGamal system [13]. In this chapter, we discuss the
third category of public key cryptosystem, which is based on the knapsack problem,
an NP-complete problem. The cryptosystem was proposed by Merkle and Hellman,
and was called the Merkle-Hellman Knapsack cryptosystem [42]. Then we are going
to introduce a new public key cryptosystem, called a Non-linear Knapsack Public-Key
Cryptosystem [25, 26], which is the foundation of our work.
An attractive feature of the Merkle-Hellman Knapsack system is its high efficiency. The
RSA system is very slow by comparisons [47]. When n is 100, a value recommended
in Merkle and Hellman’s original paper, the system is more than 100 times faster than
RSA system (with the modulus of about 500 bits) in both hardware and software. Its
speed can even compete against traditional symmetric cryptosystems.
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Unfortunately, the Merkle-Hellman Knapsack system and its many variants were bro-
ken by Shamir’s algorithm [57] and later by LLL algorithm [35], whereas the other two
categories survived existing crypto attacks, and are said to be safe for practical use [26].
Due to the failure, researchers seemed not to focus their efforts on knapsack cryptosys-
tems any further. Moreover, in 2000, IEEE adopted P1363: Standard Specifications
for Public-Key Cryptography [21], the discussions about the knapsack cryptosystems
were notably missing. This demonstrates the cryptographic community’s opinion on
and the reality about knapsack cryptosystems: they are no longer important [33].
In order to revive a cryptosystem in the third category, Kiriyama [25] recently pro-
posed a new public-key cryptosystem based on NP-completeness of non-linear knapsack
problem, and called it the Non-linear Knapsack Cryptosystem. We believe this new
scheme brings theoretical breakthroughs to the research of knapsack cryptosystems.
We extend his work in three ways, which will be discussed in the following chapters.
In this chapter, we start with a general overview of the mathematical foundation
of knapsack problems: the theory of NP-completeness in section 3.2, followed by an
overview of Merkle-Hellman Knapsack Scheme in section 3.3. Then Shamir’s method
for attacking to the Merkle-Hellman Knapsack Scheme is briefly explained in section
3.4. After that, Kiriyama’s non-linear knapsack scheme is presented in section 3.5,
and the evaluations of his scheme, which is mainly focused on security and efficiency
analysis, are given in section 3.6. Finally, we summarize the whole chapter in section
3.7.
3.2 The Theory of NP-completeness
Before we introduce the theory of NP-completeness, let us start with an interesting
example, drawn from a famous book, Computers and Intractability: a Guide to the
theory of NP-Completeness [16].
Suppose that one day, your boss asks you to design an efficient algorithm to a prob-
lem. Several weeks later, you have not been able to come up with any algorithms
substantially better than brute force searching through all possible solutions, which
takes years of computation time. Certainly you do not want to tell your boss:
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Sorry, I can not find an efficient algorithm. I guess I am just too dumb.
In order to avoid being fired by your boss, you’d better to say:
I can not find an efficient algorithm, because no such algorithm is pos-
sible!
However, unfortunately, proving the above announcement is as hard as finding an
efficient algorithm. Another good way is to announce to your boss:
I can not find an efficient algorithm, but neither can all these famous
people.
That is to say, you prove to your boss that your problem is as hard as many other
problems, which are widely recognized as being difficult. Even famous experts can not
find an efficient algorithm for it. Thus, at least you let your boss understand even
hiring an expert does not make any differences.
The theory of NP-completeness is such a technique for proving that a given problem
is “just as hard as” a large number of other problems that are widely recognized as
being difficult and that have been confounding the experts for years [16].
Firstly, we are going to introduce the class P in section 3.2.1, followed by the introduc-
tion of the class NP and NP-completeness in section 3.2.2. After that, the relationships
of P, NP, and NP-completeness are given in section 3.2.3.
3.2.1 The class P
The problems in P can be solved in polynomial time. That is to say, given the input
size n, the worst-case running time for them is O(nk) for some constant k. For example,
sorting problems can be done in O(nlogn) when n numbers need to be sorted.
36
Without loss of generality, the class P is defined on decision problems that are solvable
by polynomial time deterministic algorithms. By this we mean that the answer in
polynomial time to decision problems is simply “yes” or “no”. Take a sorting problem
for example, its decision version might be : “Given a sequence of numbers, is this
sequence in increasing order? ” We think of problems that are solvable by polynomial
time deterministic algorithms as being tractable, or easy [9], where O(n) and O(nlogn)
are classified in the same polynomial time complexity.
The definition of the class P provides a useful hint to us. If a decision problem is not
in the class P, it must be intractable, or hard. That is to say, this problem can not be
solved in polynomial time. The class NP contains such problems. We will talk about
the class NP in detail in the next subsection.
Polynomials have nice “closure” properties [30]. If an algorithm for a complex problem
consists of several algorithms for the simple problems, then the complexity of that
algorithm is always bounded by the sum or the product of the complexities of its several
component algorithms, since polynomials are closed under addition, multiplication, or
composition.
There exists another property for the problems in the class P. If a problem can be solved
in polynomial time in one model, it can be solved in polynomial time in another [9].
For example, if a class of problems can be solved in polynomial time on random access
machines, they are also solvable in polynomial time on Turing machines, which are
basic symbol-manipulating devices (for the detailed descriptions, please see [37, 20]).
3.2.2 The class NP and NP-completeness
As mentioned above, there are some problems that can not be solved in polynomial
time. For example, the Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP) belongs to this class. TSP
can be simply stated as follows:
A salesman wishes to make a tour among a set of cities, n, visiting each
city exactly once and finishing at the city he starts from. There is an integer
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cost c(i, j) to travel from the city i to the city j, and the salesman wishes
to make the tour whose total cost is bounded by B. Does there exist a tour
of all the cities having cost B or less?
For n cities TSP, there are (n − 1)! different tours. As picking any cities as the first,
there are (n− 1) choices for the second city visits, (n− 2) choices for the third, and so
on. Thus, the number of solutions becomes extremely large for large n. So far people
can not find any solutions to solve this problem in polynomial time. By this we do
not mean that such algorithms do not exist. What we mean is there are no known
polynomial time algorithms, that have been found by scientists so far.
However, if someone claims to have found an instance for the above TSP for which the
answer is “yes”, it is easy for us to verify the truth or falsity of his claim merely by
checking whether the total cost of his tour is bounded by B or not. The computational
time of our verification process is polynomial. In other words, we do not care how
much time is spent in searching one possible tour among all tours. We just verify in
polynomial time whether the answer for the problem is “yes”.
Therefore, informally speaking, the algorithms for the problems in the class NP can be
divided into two stages. One is a guessing stage; the other is a checking stage. That
is to say, we may guess all possible solutions in the first stage, for the given problem.
Then taking each of them as the input to the second stage, we check the truth or falsity
of each of them in polynomial time by verifying whether the answer to the problem
is “yes” or “no”. We call such a class of problems for which there are polynomial
bounded nondeterministic algorithms to be the class NP.
NP-complete problems, generally speaking, are the hardest class of problems that are
in the class NP. In addition, if there exists a polynomial algorithm for any one NP-
complete problem, then there would be a polynomial algorithm for each problem in
NP. In theory, any known NP-complete problem can be used to prove a new problem
is NP-complete, by using the method of reductions, or transformations. For example,
suppose that we want to solve a problem A1 and we already have an algorithm for the
problem A2. Suppose that we also have a function T that takes an input x for A1 and
produces T (x) in polynomial time, an input for A2 such that the answer for A1 on x
38
is “yes” if and only if the answer for A2 on T (x) is “yes”. Then by combining T and
the algorithm for A2 we have an algorithm for A1. Figure 3.1 shows the reduction of
problem A1 to problem A2. A2 is as hard as A1. In other words, if A2 is NP-hard, so
is A1.
T Algorithm For A(input forA )2
T(x)
"yes" or "no"(input for A )
x
1
2
Figure 3.1: Reductions of Problem A1 to A2 [16]
The first NP-complete problem is provided by Cook’s theorem, which is called the
SATISFIABILITY (SAT) problem. It is described as follows:
Is there a truth assignment, i.e. a way to assign the values true or false,
for the variables in a Boolean expression so that the whole expression has
value true [30]?
After the first NP-complete problem is proposed, a series of problems have been shown
to be NP-complete, through reductions or transformations. The following figure 3.2
shows the transformations of some of them. Noticeably, the knapsack problem is
referred to as an NP-complete problem, which provides the mathematical foundation
for the Merkle-Hellman knapsack cryptosystem. We will describe it in detail later.
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3−SATClique
Feedback Edge Set
Colorability
Exact Cover
Knapsack
Vertex Cover
Feedback Vertex Cover Set CoverDirected Hamilton Circuit
Undirected Hamilton Circuit
Figure 3.2: Transformations of NP-complete Problems [28]
3.2.3 The relationships among the class P, NP, and NP-complete
The first relationship between P and NP is P ⊆ NP. As we can see from the above
discussions, any polynomial time nondeterministic algorithm in the class NP consists
of two stages, namely the guessing stage, and the checking stage. Any polynomial time
deterministic algorithm in the class P can be used as the checking stage. In other words,
a deterministic algorithm A can be regarded as the second stage of a nondeterministic
algorithm without the guessing stage. For example, if A is a deterministic algorithm
for a problem in the class P and runs in polynomial time, we can obtain a polynomial
time nondeterministic algorithm for the problem, just taking A as the checking stage
and ignoring the guessing stage. Thus we can claim that A is a polynomial time
nondeterministic algorithm for the problem, which implies the problem belongs to the
class NP as well.
It is not surprising that a big open question, “Does P = NP or P 6= NP hold? ” arises.
So far, researchers have not found any proof to the above question. However, it is
extensively believed that the equation P 6= NP holds, because NP seems to be more
powerful than P, and researchers have not found any methods to convert NP to P.
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If there was a polynomial time algorithm for an NP-complete problem, then there
would be a polynomial time algorithm for each problem in NP [30]. That is to say, the
equation P = NP will hold.
Based on the above discussions, the relationships among P, NP, and NP-completeness
are shown as follows, when P is not equal to NP:
NP
P
NPI
NPC
Figure 3.3: The World of NP Problems, unless P = NP [9]
NPC and P respectively denote the class NP-complete and the class P. Both are wholly
obtained within the class NP and P ∩ NPC = ∅ [9]. NPI is a class of problems that
has not yet been proved either to belong to P or NP-complete [16].
3.3 The Merkle-Hellman Knapsack Cryptosystem
In this section, we will give a general overview about the knapsack problem in section
3.3.1, followed by a detailed description of the Merkle-Hellman knapsack cryptosystem.
3.3.1 The knapsack problem
The knapsack problem can be simply stated as: Given a set of integers A= {a1, a2, ..., an}
and an integer S, we need to decide whether there is a subset of A that sums to exactly
S [63]. That is defined as the following formula:
n∑
i=1
xiai = S, (xi ∈ {0, 1} for all i)
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In the worst case, it is a very difficult problem to solve (also called as the Hard-
Knapsack problem), requiring an exponential amount of time [63]. However, if a set of
integers A is a super-increasing sequence, which has the property that each ai is larger
than the sum of the preceding i−1 elements, this problem can be solved in O(n2) time
(called as the Easy-Knapsack problem), by using the following algorithm (called the
decryption algorithm for our convenience):
i = n;
while (i ≥ 1) do the following:
{
If S ≥ ai then xi = 1, and S = S − ai;
Else xi = 0;
i−−;
}
Return {x1, x2, ...xn}
We examine each ai, for (i = n, n− 1, ..., 1). If ai > S, we cannot choose ai. Otherwise
we choose ai and decrease S by ai. The process proceeds with S decreased as necessary
until we finish. Note that each ai is given by n bits, thus it takes O(n) to subtract ai
from S. Therefore, it takes O(n2) time for the examination of n numbers.
Based on the NP-completeness of the knapsack problem, Merkle-Hellman proposed
a public key cryptosystem. Anyone who tries to solve the Hard-Knapsack problem
requires an exponential amount of time, whereas those who solve the Easy-Knapsack
problem only require O(n2), which is polynomial time.
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3.3.2 The Merkle-Hellman knapsack cryptosystem
The main idea of the Merkle-Hellman knapsack cryptosystem is to transform an Easy-
Knapsack problem to a Hard-Knapsack problem, while keeping the transformation
parameters secret.
Specifically, the user generates a super-increasing sequence {ai} as his/her private key.
Then he/she generates a multiplier w and a prime number p such that p >
n∑
i=1
ai, and
gcd(w, p) = 1. The multiplier w and prime number p are the secret parameters. The
sequence {ai} is converted to {a′i} by a′i = ai ∗ w (mod p), for i = 1, ..., n. Thus, the
sequence {a′i} is no longer super-increasing, but random-looking. It is published as the
user’s public key.
When someone wishes to send the information to this user, he transforms the plaintext
to the vector x(= x1x2...xn), which is a binary vector of the length n. Then he
computes C =
n∑
i=1
x ∗ a′i and sends C to the receiver. The intended receiver computes
M = C ∗ w−1 (mod p) first (w−1 is the multiplicative inverse of w mod p), and then
applies the above decryption algorithm to recover the vector x, which can be recovered
into the original plaintext.
Initially, when this scheme was established in 1978, Merkle and Hellman claimed that
it was secure. Anyone who does not know the multiplier w, the prime number p, and
the multiplicative inverse w−1 of w mod p, has great difficulty in decrypting the vector
x, based on the difficulty of solving an NP-complete knapsack problem. Unfortunately
this scheme was broken later, due to the linearity of the problem, and the property of
super-increasing sequence. The next section presents Shamir’s method for attacking
to the above scheme.
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3.4 Shamir’s Attacks to the Merkle-Hellman Knap-
sack Scheme
The security of the Merkle-Hellman knapsack scheme lies in hiding information by
using the public key, so that only the user who knows the private key can recover the
ciphertext in polynomial time. Otherwise it is an NP-complete problem.
However, Shamir broke this scheme without the knowledge of original super-increasing
sequence, a multiplier w, and a prime number p. His attack method is based on the
fact that any public key that is obtained from a super-increasing sequence has infinitely
many super-increasing private keys that can decipher all messages [11].
That is to say, it is possible to find another pair of numbers, W and P to replace the
original multiplier w and the prime number p (also called modulus). Then through
the public key sequence {a′i}, the attacker computes another super-increasing sequence
{a′′i } (to replace the original super-increasing sequence {ai}) so that this new sequence
can be used to decrypt the ciphertext. The following small example (from [11]) illus-
trates how Shamir’s attack method works.
Supposed that we have a super-increasing sequence {171, 196, 457, 1191, 2410} as a
public key, a multiplier w of 2550, and a modulus p of 8443. Thus we obtain the
enciphering key {5457, 1663, 216, 6013, 7439}.
Given that the vector x = (01011), the sender computes C = 15115. The intended
receiver obtains M = C ∗ w−1 (mod p), that is M = 15115 ∗ 3950 (mod 8443) = 3797,
(w−1 = 3950). Then the receiver applies the decryption algorithm, which is easy for
him to recover the vector x = (01011).
Now if we multiply each element a′i in the enciphering key by 46mod 77, which is an-
other pair of numbers, a multiplier and a modulus, we obtain a sequence {2, 37, 3, 14, 6}.
After ordering, this is a super-increasing sequence {2, 3, 6, 14, 37}, which can be used
to decrypt the ciphertext.
We compute M = 15115 ∗ 46 (mod 77) = 57. Then we apply the decryption algorithm
to M . We can compute a vector x = (00111). After we re-order the vector sequence
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to the original order, the vector x actually is (01011), which is the same result as that
of the intended receiver.
As we can see from this example, there exists at least one pair of numbers, a multiplier
W and a modulus P , different from the original one, that can be used to generate
another private key from the public key in the public place. Shamir’s main contribution
was to notice that the Lenstra’s integer programming theorem [36] could be used to
find at least one pair of parameters W and P in polynomial time. Once these numbers
are found, the attackers can decrypt the ciphertext easily. For those people who are
interested on the detailed attack method, please see [47, 57, 11]. Another attack
method is called LLL algorithm [35] proposed by Lenstra, et. al., which is more widely
accepted for the breaking of such knapsack cryptosystems and their variants.
3.5 A Non-linear Knapsack Scheme
3.5.1 A non-linear knapsack scheme
To save the knapsack cryptosystems, Kiriyama proposed in March 2005 a non-linear
knapsack scheme [25], which overcomes the weaknesses of the linear knapsack cryp-
tosystem. The following illustrates the non-linear knapsack problem, and then demon-
strates a non-linear knapsack scheme with a small example.
Let fi(x) be a non-linear function of x, and x be an m-ary vector x = (x1x2...xn).
Each xi is regarded as a symbol of the alphabet {1, 2, ...,m}. The non-linear knapsack
problem is presented as follows:
M =
n∑
i=1
fi(xi)
That is to say, given an integer M , the solution for the above equation is to choose
appropriate kinds of item 1, 2, ..., n to make M , whereas in linear knapsack problem
mentioned before, the solution is to choose an item or not to make M . The vector x
is a binary vector of length n in the latter.
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The following demonstrates the non-linear knapsack scheme with a small example.
parameters:
n : number of items
m : number of kinds
l : number of mask bits for each item
mask(i) : mask pattern of item i, has ln bits of which l bits are 1 and the rest are 0.
mask(i) has the following properties:
mask(i)&mask(j) = (00...0), all 0 for i 6= j
& denotes binary bitwise and operation
Bitwise union of all mask(i) is (11...1), all 1
fi(j) : mapping from j to value(i, j) is denoted by fi(j). Let value(i, j) be a vector
not greater than mask(i) as a binary vector, where order x 5 y for x = x1...xn and
y = y1...yn is defined by xi 5 yi for i = 1, ..., n.
p : a prime number such that p > 2ln
w : a multiplier, such that gcd(w, p) = 1
w−1 : a multiplicative inverse of w mod p
lemma:
mask(i)&fi(j) = fi(j)
mask(i)&fk(j) = (00...0), all 0 for k 6= i
private key:
f =

(f1(1), f1(2), ..., f1(m))
(f2(1), f2(2), ..., f2(m))
(..., ..., ..., ...)
(fn(1), fn(2), ..., fn(m))

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For convenience, we call fi(j), ((i = 1, ..., n), (j = 1, ...,m)) as a kind.
public key:
f ′ =

(f ′1(1), f
′
1(2), ..., f
′
1(m))
(f ′2(1), f
′
2(2), ..., f
′
2(m))
(..., ..., ..., ...)
(f ′n(1), f
′
n(2), ..., f
′
n(m))

Let f ′ be obtained by operating “w times mod p ” on each kind in f . Each kind (de-
noted by f ′i(j), ((i = 1, ..., n), (j = 1, ...,m)) ) in f
′ can be computed by f ′i(j) = fi(j)∗
w (mod p), and thus each kind in f can be computed by fi(j) = f
′
i(j) ∗ w−1 (mod p).
encryption:
Let the vector x = (x1x2...xn) be an m-ary sequence of length n to be encrypted. The
ciphertext C is computed by
C =
n∑
i=1
f ′i(xi)
decryption:
The intended receiver computes M = C ∗ w−1(mod p) first. Then he/she computes
yi = f
−1
i (mask(i)&M) for i = 1, ..., n, and let y = (y1y2...yn) be the decrypted message.
example from [25]:
n = 4, m = 3, and l = 2. Four mask patterns mask(i), (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) are randomly
generated as follows:
mask(1) = (01001000)
mask(2) = (10010000)
mask(3) = (00100001)
mask(4) = (00000110)
Based on the above mask patterns, n ∗m kinds in the private key f are generated.
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f =

(00001000, 01001000, 01000000),
(10010000, 10000000, 00010000),
(00000001, 00100000, 00100001),
(00000100, 00000110, 00000010)
 =

(8, 72, 64),
(144, 128, 16),
(1, 32, 33),
(4, 6, 2)

Then the kinds in the public key f ′ are computed by f ′ = f ∗w(mod p). Let p be 283,
and w be 200, and thus w−1mod p is 75
f ′ =

(185, 250, 65),
(217, 130, 87),
(200, 174, 91),
(234, 68, 117)

If we set the vector x = (1231), then the ciphertext C is computed by C =
n∑
i=1
f ′i(xi)
= f ′1(1) + f
′
2(2) + f
′
3(3) + f
′
4(1) = 185 + 130 + 91 + 234 = 640.
The ciphertext C is sent to the receiver. The receiver computesM = C ∗w−1(mod p) =
640∗75mod 283 = 173. The binary representation of decimal number 173 is 10101101.
Then the receiver applies the “bitwise AND” operation to each mask pattern mask(i)
and M . The result is shown as follows:
10101101&mask(1) = 10101101&01001000 = 00001000→kind 1
10101101&mask(2) = 10101101&10010000 = 10000000→kind 2
10101101&mask(3) = 10101101&00100001 = 00100001→kind 3
10101101&mask(4) = 10101101&00000110 = 00000100→kind 1
Therefore, the decrypted vector y = (1231), which is identical to the original vector x.
The decryption process is successful.
3.5.2 Proof
As we mentioned before, the original message is transformed into the vector x to be
encrypted, and the vector y is recovered to construct the decrypted message. Thus,
we have to prove the vector y to be identical to the vector x.
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theorem:
y = x
proof:
yi = f
−1
i (mask(i)&M)
= f−1i (mask(i)&(C ∗ w−1 (mod p)))
= f−1i (mask(i)&(
n∑
j=1
f ′j(xj) ∗ w−1(mod p)))
= f−1i (mask(i)&
n∑
j=1
fj(xj))
= f−1i (mask(i)&
n⋃
j=1
fj(xj))
= f−1i (fi(xi)) from lemma
= xi
In the above ”
⋃
” is similar to ”
∑
” and bitwise ”or” operations are done instead of
addition.
At first glance, the mapping from each xi in the vector x to yi is not onto. Thus it
could not guarantee f−1i exists for each element i. However, in the Kiriyama scheme,
each xi is a chosen integer; although this choice is not as easy as expected. By this
we mean, we choose each kind in the item without repetition. When keys are set up,
one-to-one corresponding from xi to yi exists. For each xi, this scheme could guarantee
that there is only one yi in the corresponding range such that yi = fi(xi). Therefore,
each decrypted message would correspond to only one plaintext.
3.6 Evaluation
In this section, the security considerations are presented in section 3.6.1, followed by
efficiency analysis in section 3.6.2.
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3.6.1 Security considerations
Firstly, we have to avoid the trivial cases (including all 0) by using just a few of 2l bit
patterns in mask(i) for the kinds of item i. Secondly, we should also avoid the case
that kinds are disjoint from each other in each mask pattern mask(i). The reason for
that is we might introduce a super-increasing property on some kinds. Thus it would
become vulnerable to the super-increasing attack, as Shamir did to the Merkle-Hellman
Knapsack cryptosystem.
On the other hand, if we take heavily overlapping to each kind in the mask pattern
mask(i), it would invite an equal-sum event attack. Specifically, when we produce
each kind in the private key, if we have l bits for each mask pattern mask(i), then we
scatter no more than l ones to the mask locations in the private key, and make the rest
of the bits 0. We define the mask locations as the places that bits are 1 in each mask
pattern mask(i). For example if mask(i) is (01001000), then mask locations are the
second and fifth bits (counting from left to right). We scatter no more than l(= 2) ones
to the second or/and fifth bits, and make the rest of bits be 0. Thus kinds (01000000),
(00001000), and (01001000) could be three possible kinds in the private key.
Suppose we have four different kinds in the private key (a, b, c, d) such that the following
equation holds: a+b = c+d. Let (a′, b′, c′, d′) be the corresponding kinds in the public
key. It is evident that the equation a′ + b′ − (c′ + d′) = kp holds for some k. If
an attacker can find another set of public key’s kinds satisfying the above “equal-sum
event”, they can easily compute the value of p by using the Euclidean algorithm, which
causes the breaking of the whole system. Therefore, in order to avoid this case, we
suggest scattering l/2 ones to each kind in the private key. Moreover, the number of
kinds m could not be large, because the number of cases “equal-sum event” is given
by the formula:
m∑
i=0
m−i∑
j=0
C(m, i)C(m− i, j) = 3m. That is to say, among m kinds in
each item, the probability of that case is the sum of the number of combinations of i
out of m kinds plus that of j out of the rest of kinds, m − i. It is obvious that the
probability that two l-bits sequences are equal is 2−l. Therefore, the above situation
is bounded by (3m2−l)2, which is equal to (21.58m−l)2. For m = 10 and l = 20, this
probability is about 1/300. We further multiply this probability by n, the number of
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items. Then the probability is about 1/4 [26]. We have an “equal-sum event” at every
four settings. Thus, after the private key is set up, we have to exhaustively check the
case of “equal-sum event” for security.
The LLL method does not apply to this non-linear knapsack scheme, because this
scheme is based on the non-linear property, not the linear property.
Additionally, it is worth to note that Kiriyama has not shown how to reduce an arbi-
trary instance of some NP-complete problems to an instance of the non-linear knapsack
problem. In other words, an unknown plaintext attack on Kiriyama’s cryptosystem is
not NP-hard until a suitable transformation is supplied. Therefore, Kiriyama’s system
might not be secure although no one has proven such a reduction is not possible yet.
Actually the widely used cryptosystem RSA shares the fate. No one has mathemati-
cally proven the security of RSA wholly depends on the problem of factoring. However,
nobody proves it does not. In the future, if somebody proposes a method to prove the
reduction of NP-complete problem to the non-linear problem is possible, that would
be a theoretical breakthrough not only for the Kiriyama scheme itself, but also for the
mathematic field.
Another missing element in Kiriyama’s scheme is an average-case hard instance-generator.
So far, we know of no algorithm which will efficiently generate difficult instances for
any NP-complete problems. In any event, for practical cryptosystems, key pairs must
be based on problem instances which are hard with a high degree of certainty. As noted
in Chapter 2 of this thesis, Rabin has shown that suitably-hard instances are readily
constructed, complete with trapdoors, for the integer factorization problem. However,
a suitable instance generator is not yet available for Kiriyama’s scheme.
The final thing we want to mention here is that Chor-Rivest cryptosystem [8] is the only
knapsack-like cryptosystem that has not been broken so far, when its parameters are
chosen carefully [47]. Up to date, even Quantum machine can not break NP-complete
problems in P time. Thus, any cryptosystem related to NP-complete problems such
as Chor-Rivest cryptosystem and non-linear knapsack cryptosystem should have more
promising future. Furthermore, these cryptosystems might still be secure in the near
future unless new attacking approaches are proposed.
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3.6.2 Efficiency analysis
As we mentioned at the start of this chapter, the Merkle-Hellman knapsack scheme is
very efficient, 100 times faster than the RSA scheme. Kiriyama’s non-linear knapsack
scheme keeps advantage of efficiency.
If we use the standard O(n2) time for the multiple-precision multiplication and divi-
sion of n-bit integers, the non-linear knapsack scheme only takes O(n2) for encrypt-
ing/decrypting the given message. However, the RSA scheme requires O(n3) time for
encrypting/decrypting a message of the same size.
Some experiments were carried out to compare the running time of encryption and
decryption between the non-linear knapsack scheme and the RSA scheme. We set the
size of modulus in the RSA scheme to be about 100 decimal digits, which is thought
to be safe for the scheme itself. As for the non-linear knapsack scheme, we set the
number of items, n, to be 16, the number of kinds, m, to be 10 and the number of
mask bits, l, to be 20. Thus the size of modulus in the non-linear knapsack scheme is
about 100 digits, which has a comparable size to that of the RSA scheme.
The following table shows the result of our experiments, when we encrypt/decrypt
a file with 2KB. All experiments are running on the Linux machine with a Celeron
process with 2.2 GHz. The implementation of both schemes is in the C language.
RSA Non linear
E(Encryption) D(Decryption) E(Encryption) D(Decryption)
1st Experiment (Sec.) 5.314 5.541 0.021 0.062
2nd Experiment (Sec.) 5.558 5.710 0.021 0.063
3rd Experiment (Sec.) 4.928 4.992 0.023 0.066
Aver. Time (Sec.) 5.267 5.414 0.022 0.064
E+D Aver. Time (Sec.) 10.681 0.086
Table 3.1: Comparisons About the Running Time
As can be seen from the above table, the total time of encryption and decryption in the
non-linear knapsack scheme is about 125 times faster than that in the RSA scheme.
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The memory size for the non-linear knapsack scheme is about lmn2 = 6KB, which is
reasonable.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we started with a general overview of the theory of NP-completeness.
Then the Merkle-Hellman knapsack scheme was presented, followed by Shamir’s attack
against the Merkle-Hellman knapsack scheme. After that, the non-linear knapsack
scheme and its correctness proof for decryption are illustrated in detail. Finally we
evaluate the non-linear knapsack scheme from two aspects: security consideration, and
efficiency analysis.
Chapter 4
An Encrypted (n,n) Threshold
Secret Sharing Scheme
4.1 Introduction
The motivation for secret sharing schemes originates from the problems associated with
exchanging secret keys. Secret sharing schemes enhance the reliability of safeguarding
keys or other secrets without increasing risk. The following example will illustrate the
concept of secret sharing [65]. Suppose you and your friend accidentally discover a
fortune, but neither of you are ready to carry it at that moment. So you two decide
to draw a map and go home for preparation. Then when you are ready, you both
return to carry the fortune home. Now the question is who is going to keep the map.
Apparently, both you and your friend do not really trust each other, and you are afraid
that if the other keeps the map, he/she will go alone and take the fortune. Therefore,
both of you need to find a way to keep the map so that you can each ensure the other
one will not go back alone. It is to split a map into two pieces and make sure the
location can be specified only when two pieces are provided. Then you and your friend
get one each and happily go home to do your preparations.
Formally speaking, the idea of secret sharing is to start with a secret, and divide it into
pieces called shares which are distributed amongst users such that the pooled shares
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of specific subsets of users allow reconstruction of the original secret [41].
In a secret sharing scheme, there is one dealer and n participants. The dealer is a
person who sets up the scheme and distributes the secrets to the participants. The
participants hold their own shares until t (for threshold, t ≤ n) of them or more decide
to pool their shares together in order to recover the secret. The recovery of the secret is
accomplished by a person/device, so-called a combiner, who collects t or more shares to
compute the secret. However, the collections of t− 1 or fewer shares by a combiner do
not allow the secret be recovered. Such a secret sharing scheme is called (t, n) threshold
secret sharing scheme. The security of this scheme is based on an assumption that it is
impossible or hard for an attacker to get t or more shares, which causes the exposure
of the secret.
In 1979, Shamir [56] and Blakley [4] independently devised threshold schemes. They
both addressed the above issue of safeguarding the cryptographic keys, although their
approaches to solving this issue were different. Since the notion was proposed by
them, many other secret sharing schemes have been presented, for instance, Asmuth
and Bloom [2], Brickell [7] and Karin et. al [24]. The majority of them are (t, n)
threshold schemes.
We propose an (n, n) threshold secret sharing scheme by combining the concept of Chi-
nese Remaindering Theorem (CRT, defined in section 4.3) and the non-linear knapsack
scheme with the concept of secret sharing. The main advantage of our scheme is to
increase the difficulty of recovering the plaintext for attackers outside of the group, be-
cause each share is encrypted already by using the non-linear knapsack scheme which
was presented in chapter 3. That is to say, even if attackers obtain all n shares some-
how, it is still hard for them to recover the plaintext. However, a weakness of our
scheme is that we cannot prevent attacks from the inside of the group. In other words,
if a group member collects n shares, then he/she can easily recover the plaintext.
We start with the general overviews of Shamir’s and Blakley’s secret sharing schemes
in section 4.2. Then our scheme is illustrated in section 4.3, followed by the analysis
of security in section 4.4. Finally, a conclusion is given in section 4.5.
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4.2 General Overviews of Shamir’s and Blakley’s
Secret Sharing Schemes
As we mentioned before, Shamir and Blakley first proposed the notion of secret shar-
ing schemes independently in 1979. Their approaches were different, but they both
addressed the ways of solving the issue of safeguarding cryptographic keys. Simply
speaking, Shamir used Lagrange polynomial interpolation to design (t, n) threshold
secret sharing scheme, whereas Blakley used projective spaces to construct a (t, n)
threshold scheme. We present both schemes in more details in this section.
4.2.1 Shamir’s (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme
For simplicity, let us start with the design of a (2, n) secret sharing scheme. Suppose
we want to share a secret S among n participants, and only when any 2 or more
participants pool their shares together, the secret S can be recovered by a combiner.
Figure 4.1 shows the idea using the coordinate system.
(0, S)
.
.
.
(x2, y2)
(xn, yn)(x1, y1)
Y
X
Figure 4.1: Shamir’s Scheme
Firstly, a dealer selects the point (0, S) on the Y axis, which corresponds to the secret
S. Then he/she randomly draws a line through this point, and picks any n points
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(x1, y1), (x2, y2), ...(xn, yn) on this line. Each point represents a share. The dealer
securely distributes those n shares to n participants. As we all know, two points
uniquely determine a line. Therefore, when any two participants pool their shares
together, that line is uniquely determined, so that the secret is recovered successfully.
One participant on his/her own cannot know that line and the secret. Similarly, a (3, n)
threshold secret sharing scheme is designed as follows: a curve through the secret S
can be determined by any 3 points, not 2 points or 1 point. Therefore, when any 3 or
more participants pool their shares together, the secret can be disclosed.
Formally speaking, for (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme, we use the curve that
corresponds to a (t− 1) degree polynomial:
f(x) = at−1 ∗ xt−1 + at−2 ∗ xt−2 + ...+ a1 ∗ x+ a0
This curve goes through the Y axis at the point, (0, S), which represents the secret
S. Then the dealer randomly chooses n points and securely distributes them. Any
t points uniquely determine that curve. The Lagrange interpolation formula allows
us to determine the polynomial f(x) of degree (t − 1) from the t different points
(xij , f(xij)) = (xij , Sij) for j = 1, ..., t, thus
f(x) =
t∑
j=1
Sij
∏
1≤l≤t,l 6=j
x− xil
xij − xil
Noticeably, the polynomial is defined over a finite field Zp, which is formed by the poly-
nomial f(x) modulo a prime number p. Therefore, the computation of the polynomial
f(x) can be expressed by
f(x) =
t∑
j=1
Sij
∏
1≤l≤t,l 6=j
(x− xil) ∗ (xij − xil)−1 (mod p)
The secret S = f(0), therefore we obtain
S = a0 =
t∑
j=1
Sijbj,
where bj =
∏
1≤l≤t,l 6=j
xil ∗ (xil − xij)
−1
(mod p) [50] (suppose p is a prime number).
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Any attackers who collect t− 1 shares cannot compute the secret S because the t− 1
equations cannot determine t unknowns. Therefore, Shamir’s scheme is a perfect secret
sharing scheme (the definition of “perfect scheme” will be given later in section 4.3.)
because the knowledge of t− 1 shares does not provide any advantage to an opponent
over knowing no pieces [41]. In addition, it is also an ideal secret sharing scheme, which
means the size of shares is equal to that of the secret.
4.2.2 Blakley’s (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme
As we mentioned before, Blakley also devised a secret sharing scheme by using a
different approach. His scheme used projective spaces to construct a (t, n) threshold
secret sharing scheme [50].
As we all know, two nonparallel lines in the same plane intersect at exactly one point.
Three nonparallel planes in space intersect at exactly one point. More generally, any
n n-dimensional hyperplanes intersect at a specific point. Therefore, a dealer hides
a secret in any single coordinate of the point of intersection. Then each participant
is given enough information to define a hyperplane. When t or more of them decide
to recover the secret, a combiner computes the plane’s intersection point. Any t − 1
or fewer shares can not determine the secret. However, t − 1 shares provide some
information to narrow the secret down to the line because they intersect to a line.
Figure 4.2 presents the idea of Blakley’s secret sharing scheme. L1, L2, and L3 are
three lines in 3 different hyperplanes, which intersect at a point representing a secret
S.
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L1
L2
L3
S
Figure 4.2: Blakley’s Scheme
Compared with Shamir’s scheme, Blakley’s scheme is not perfect because t− 1 shares
do provide some information to an opponent. Thus the more participants collude,
the more risk there is that the points will be exposed. However, this scheme can be
modified to achieve perfect security by adding restrictions [59].
4.3 Our Scheme: (Encrypted) (n, n) Threshold Se-
cret Sharing Scheme
Before we start to describe our scheme, we mention the Chinese Remainder Theorem
[41].
Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT): Let n1, n2, ..., nr be pairwise co-prime,
where n = n1 ∗ n2 ∗ ... ∗ nr. Then the system of congruences
x ≡ xi (modni), i = 1, ..., r
has a unique solution x in {0, ..., n− 1}
That is to say, the CRT asserts the equivalence of the representation of integers in
modular arithmetic, i.e. x mod n is equivalent to the vector representations (x1, ..., xr)
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[28]. The solution x to the simultaneous congruences in the CRT may be computed as
x =
r∑
i=1
xiNiMi(modn), where Ni =
n
ni
, and Mi = N
−1
i (modni).
Let us illustrate it with a small example with r = 2. Let p and q be two prime numbers,
and let N be the product of p and q. Suppose M (denoted as a positive integer) is the
message to be shared, such that M < N . Let x = M mod p, and y = Mmod q. Then
M is uniquely determined by the formula: M = xqq−1 + ypp−1(modN), where p−1 is
the multiplicative inverse of p mod q, and q−1 is the multiplicative inverse of q mod p.
Combining the concept of CRT with the non-linear knapsack scheme, we develop an
encrypted secret sharing scheme. That is to say, each share generated by a dealer is
encrypted using a non-linear knapsack scheme, before it is distributed to all partici-
pants. Thus, even if all shares are collected by an attacker outside of the group, the
secret is still hard to recover.
The following illustrates our scheme. For simplicity, we go with a (2, 2) secret sharing
scheme first, and we omit the definition of the parameters that appeared in the non-
linear knapsack scheme.
parameters:
n1, n2 : let them be two large prime numbers
N : let N be the product of n1 and n2, and gcd(w,N) = 1, where w is a random
number as a multiplier
n−11 , n
−1
2 : let n
−1
1 be the multiplicative inverse of n1 mod n2, and n
−1
2 be the multi-
plicative inverse of n2 mod n1
fi(j) : let fi(j) be one kind in the private key
fki (j) : let f
k
i (j) be the kind in the public key corresponding to the kind fi(j) in the
private key. k represents kth participant’s public key, k = (1, 2) in this small example.
private key:
Let f be the private key known to all k participants, which can be represented as
follows:
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f =

(f1(1), f1(2), ..., f1(m))
(f2(1), f2(2), ..., f2(m))
(..., ..., ..., ...)
(fn(1), fn(2), ..., fn(m))

public key:
f ′k =

(f ′k1(1), f
′k
1(2), ..., f
′k
1(m))
(f ′k2(1), f
′k
2(2), ..., f
′k
2(m))
(..., ..., ..., ...)
(f ′kn(1), f
′k
n(2), ..., f
′k
n(m))

Let f ′k be obtained by the operation “w times mod nk, (k = 1, 2) ” on each kind in
f . Each kind in f ′k can be expressed by f ′ki (j) = fi(j) ∗ w (modnk), (k = (1, 2), i =
(1, 2, ..., n), j = (1, 2, ...,m)), and thus each kind in f can be expressed by fi(j) =
f ′ki (j) ∗ w−1 (modnk), (k = (1, 2), i = (1, 2, ..., n), j = (1, 2, ...,m)).
Ownerships of parameters/keys:
To be private To be public
private key f
a multiplier w public key f ′k
the value of N =
2∏
k=1
nk
each nk and NkN
−1
k , (k = 1, 2),(Nk =
N
nk
, N−1k = (
N
nk
)−1)
Table 4.1: Ownerships of parameters/Keys
Some of the private parameters/keys shown in the above table are revealed to all
participants when the system is set up, whereas others are only known to the combiner.
Specifically, each participant Pk, (k = 1, 2) only knows the private key f , the multiplier
w, and the product of Nk andN
−1
k , (k = 1, 2). Each nk is not known to each participant
Pk, (k = 1, 2). Only the trusted authority knows each nk, (k = 1, 2). Thus the trusted
authority computes the kinds in the public key for each participant by f ′ki (j) = fi(j) ∗
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w (modnk), (k = 1, 2), (i = 1, 2, ..., n), (j = 1, 2, ...,m), and distributes the value of
NkN
−1
k to each participant securely. Then it disappears after the public keys are set
up. As for the value of N , only an combiner knows its value.
shares generation:
1. Suppose the dealer wants to send an encrypted message M for all participants
among the group, such that they can read it only when they all agree to recover
it. Let message M be represented as the vector x = (x1x2...xn). The dealer
computes two cryptograms C1 and C2 for those two participants by
C1 =
n∑
i=1
f 1i (xi)
C2 =
n∑
i=1
f 2i (xi)
2. The dealer distributes C1 and C2 to the corresponding participant Pk without
worrying about being known by an attacker.
secret recovery:
1. When all participants decide to recover the secret, they compute the partial
information of the secret by their own. The partial information is computed by
Ck ∗ w−1 ∗ (NkN−1k ), (k = 1, 2). Let Nk be Nnk , and N
−1
k be (
N
nk
)−1.
2. Each participant sends the partial result to the combiner
3. The combiner computes the value of the message M by
M =
2∑
k=1
Ck ∗ w−1 ∗NkN−1k (modN)
4. Since M =
n∑
i=1
fi(xi), the combiner recovers the secret by using the previous
non-linear decryption scheme. Thus the secret is known by all participants at
the same time.
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example:
Let us take the following values for each parameter.
w = 200, n1 = 17, n2 = 19, N = n1 ∗ n2 = 323, w−1 = 21, n−11 = 9, n−12 = 9,
n1n
−1
1 = 153, and n2n
−1
2 = 171
Thus the private key is f =

(8, 72, 64)
(144, 128, 16)
(1, 32, 33)
(4, 6, 2)
, the same as shown in the non-
linear knapsack scheme. The public keys are different. They are computed as f ′1 =
(2, 1, 16)
(2, 15, 4)
(13, 8, 4)
(1, 10, 9)
 and f ′2 =

(4, 17, 13)
(15, 7, 8)
(10, 16, 7)
(2, 3, 1)
.
Let the message M be represented as the vector x = (1231), thus the ciphertexts are
computed by C1 = 2 + 15 + 4 + 1 = 22, and C2 = 4 + 7 + 7 + 2 = 20. C1 and C2 are
distributed to two participants.
When participants decide to recover the secret, they compute their own partial in-
formation, which are C1 ∗ w−1 ∗ NkN−1k = 79002 and C2 ∗ w−1 ∗ NkN−1k = 64260,
respectively. They send the results to the combiner. The combiner adds two val-
ues of the partial information, and thus the value of the message is computed as
M = (79002 + 64260) (modN) = 173.
Applying the non-linear decryption scheme to the value of M , the combiner gets the
secret message as the vector x = (1231), which is the same as the original value.
For generality, we let n1, n2, ..., nk be numbers which are relatively prime, and let
N be the product of all numbers ni, (i = 1, 2, ..., k). And then let Ni =
N
ni
, and
Mi = N
−1
i (modni) for i = 1, 2, ..., k. The public key is computed as
f ′li(j) = fi(j) ∗ w (modnl), for l = 1, 2, ...k
The dealer computes the cryptograms by Cl =
n∑
i=1
f li(xi), (l = 1, 2, ..., k), and dis-
tributes Cl, (l = 1, 2, ..., k) to k participants.
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Each participant computes their own partial information by Cl ∗ w−1 ∗ NlMl, (l =
1, 2, ..., k). Then the results are sent to the combiner. The combiner computes the
value of M by M =
k∑
l=1
Cl ∗ w−1 ∗ NlMl (modN), and then applies the non-linear
knapsack scheme to recover the secret.
4.4 Analysis of Security
As we mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, Shamir’s threshold secret sharing
scheme is a perfect scheme, whereas Blakley scheme is not.
If a (t, n) secret sharing scheme is perfect, then even if any t − 1 participants collude
in order to recover the secret, they still would not determine more information about
the secret than an outsider, who does not hold any shares. In Shamir’s scheme, the
collections of t − 1 shares do not give any help to recover the secret. However, in
Blakley’s scheme, each participant with a share of the secret knows the secret is a
point in his hyperplane. Therefore, the latter is not a perfect scheme, whereas the
former is.
According to the above definition, our (n, n) threshold secret sharing scheme is not per-
fect. For simplicity of illustrations, we take n = 2 as an example. Suppose that b1 and
b2 are two kinds in a participant P1’s public key, and a1 and a2 are two corresponding
kinds in the private key. Thus b1 and b2 can be expressed by
b1 = a1 ∗ w (modn1) = a1 ∗ w + k1n1, (for some constant k1)
b2 = a2 ∗ w (modn1) = a2 ∗ w + k2n1, (for some constant k2)
where n1 is a prime number. The above equations can be expressed as
a2b1 − a1b2 = (a2k1 − a1k2)n1 (1)
If another pair of kinds (b3, b4) is found, then another equation (2) is made as follows:
a4b3 − a3b4 = (a4k3 − a3k4)n1 (2)
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Thus another participant within the group P2 can obtain the value of n1 by computing
the value of gcd(a2b1 − a1b2, a4b3 − a3b4) (all values of from a1 to a4 and from b1 to b4
are all known to P2), which causes other secret values known to P2, such as n
−1
1 , and
n1n2. That is to say, if P2 somehow obtains the cryptogram C1 from P1, the secret
would be revealed to P2 without any help from another participant P1.
In addition, in any perfect secret sharing schemes, if any participant had a share of
bit-size less than that of the secret, the knowledge of the shares would reduce the
security of the secret. Take the case of two participants for example. Suppose that
the message M (denoted as an integer) has n bits, and M < N , where N = n1n2.
By introducing two members, we reduce the size of N to half if the size of each nk
is nearly equal. Thus, the size of each share Ck, (k = 1, 2) is
n
2
bits. For generality,
if the number of participants increases to k, the size of each participant’s share is
decreased to n
k
bits, if the size of secret is fixed. Thus for the authorized participants,
we invite the exhaustive search easily because the uncertainty of the secret is reduced.
However, if we fix the number of participants to k, and increase the size of the secret,
the decryption time would increase. Therefore, for our scheme, we have to adjust those
parameters depending on the situation.
Another weakness in our scheme is that it might not be convenient for the sys-
tem to dynamically update when new users join in. In that case, the parameters
NlMl, (l = 1, 2, ..., k) have been updated and distributed over all participants. In ad-
dition, the participants’ public keys have been updated as well. Therefore, it might be
inconvenient for a large system to update.
Although our scheme has such several weaknesses, the advantage of our proposed
scheme over other schemes would be that it increases the security against attacks from
outsiders. That is to say, even if outsiders collect all the shares from the participants,
they still could not recover the secret because each share is encrypted. As we can see
from the description in section 4.3, when all participants decide to recover the secret,
they compute the partial information by Cl ∗ w−1 ∗ NlMl, (l = 1, 2, ..., k), and then
they send their partial results to the combiner. For the combiner, he/she is the only
person who knows the value of N . He/she computes the value of M , and then applies
the non-linear decryption scheme to recover the secret. During this process, even if
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an attacker collects all shares, it would be still hard for him/her to recover the secret,
because for an attacker, the secret is encrypted by using non-linear knapsack scheme.
In contrast, for other schemes such as Shamir’s (t, n) scheme t or more shares are
pooled together, the combiner can easily recover the secret.
4.5 Conclusion
We have developed and presented in this chapter an encrypted (n, n) threshold secret
sharing scheme. Although our scheme is not a perfect scheme, and dynamic updating
is difficult, the merit of our system lies in the fact that we make the shares more secure
by introducing the non-linear knapsack scheme.
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Chapter 5
A Multiple Identities
Authentication Scheme
5.1 Introduction
Firstly, let us imagine the following access control scenario. A given service S allows
the users to access if they own privileges P 1, P 2, and P 3. That is to say, the users
who own the superset of privileges P 1, P 2, and P 3 are allowed to gain access to this
service S. This scenario actually involves a two-step process.
The first step is called entity authentication, also known as identification. Entity au-
thentication (identification), generally speaking, is a process by which a verifier gains
assurance that the identity of a prover is as claimed, i.e., there is no impersonation [41].
Each identity is linked to a pair of private and public key. An identification scheme
enables a prover holding a secret key to identify himself/herself to a verifier holding
the corresponding public key.
The second step, authorization, is the process of granting or denying the users’ access
to the service based on the users’ one or multiple identities. This two-step process
is also viewed as users’ needs to prove their one (or multiple) identities to the access
control system.
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A question of how to design such an access control system arises. One naive way is
to link a different public key to each privilege. For example, if a user Alice owns the
privileges P 1, P 2, and P 3, those three privileges will be correspondingly linked to three
different public keys pk1, pk2, and pk3. If she wants to gain access to the service S, she
has to prove her ownership of the privileges P 1, P 2, and P 3 one by one to the access
control system. That is to say, Alice as a prover, and Bob as a verifier (who actually
plays the role of the access control system) have to perform any identification scheme
d times, when d identities (Here identities could be users privileges which are linked
to the user’s public keys) are required for the access.
Another way is to use a public key certificate, which is a digital document signed
by the Certification Authority (CA). It contains a specially formatted block of data,
such as the certificate holder’s name, the subset of privileges, and a public key, etc.,
which all serve to validate the holder’s authorization. Thus, when a prover Alice and
a verifier Bob perform an identification scheme based on Alice’s public key certificate,
Bob checks Alice’s certificate to get the set of Alice’s privileges. If Alice’s privileges
are the superset of the ones required for the access she is attempting, access is granted.
There is the third way, which is a more attractive method than the above two. It
is called a Batching Schnorr’s Identification Scheme, which was recently proposed by
Gennaro et. al. [17]. His method greatly reduces the authentication time by do-
ing a batch processing of Schnorr’s identification scheme [55], and provides privacy-
preserving property for the users. In addition, its computational complexity is suitable
to be used in resource constrained devices.
We notice that a similar work, using the non-linear knapsack cryptosystem, can be done
to provide the functionality of multiple identities authentication. More importantly,
the computational complexity of our scheme is low as well. Our experimental results
show high efficiency of our scheme.
Related work will be given in Section 5.2, which includes the overview of the first three
ways to implement the access control system. Then our scheme will be discussed in
detail in Section 5.3, including the description of our algorithm and proof. After that,
the evaluation is presented in Section 5.4, which is focused on the analysis, and the
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comparisons of efficiency and security, followed by possible applications of our scheme
in Section 5.5. Finally we summarize the whole chapter in Section 5.6.
5.2 Related Work
5.2.1 d executions for d identities authentication
As we mentioned at the start of this chapter, a different public key is linked to each
privilege. When Alice attempts to gain access to the service S, she has to prove the
ownership of the privileges P 1, P 2, and P 3 to Bob, a verifier. Specifically speaking,
in order to prove the ownership of the privilege P 1, Alice and Bob perform an iden-
tification scheme, using for example, the Schnorr’s scheme. As shown in Figure 5.1,
Alice initiates the Schnorr’s scheme by sending her public key pk1 to Bob (Alice public
key pk1 is linked to her privilege P 1.) Then Bob challenges Alice by sending a random
number to Alice. If Alice generates the correct response based on value of the random
challenge from Bob and knowledge of her own private key, and sends the response back
to Bob, her ownership of the privilege P 1 will be accepted by Bob. Then Alice and
Bob proceed to perform the Schnorr’s scheme in order to prove Alice’s ownership of
the privilege P 2 which is linked with her public key pk2, and so forth.
pk1
a random number as a challenge
response
Alice
Alice
Alice Bob
Bob
Bob
Figure 5.1: Verification of the Privilege P 1 by Using the Schnorr Scheme
The following illustrates the Schnorr’s identification scheme in detail. Its security lies
on the difficulty of discrete logarithm problem, which was discussed in Chapter 2. Once
the private key w has been chosen one can easily compute the corresponding public key
y, such that y = g−w (mod p) [55]. However, the inverse process, to compute w from
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y, requires to compute the discrete logarithms with base g of y−1, i.e., w = − logg y,
which is assumed to be hard.
parameters:
p, q : let p and q be two prime numbers such that q|p− 1
g : let g be an element not equal to 1, such that
gq ≡ 1 (mod p)
w : let w be a random number less than q
y : let y be a number such that y = g−w mod p
private keys:
w : a private key only known by the owner
public keys:
y : a public key published in a public place
ownership of parameters / keys:
To Be Private To Be Public
public key y
private key w prime numbers p and q
an element g
Table 5.1: Ownership of Parameters/Keys
actions of scheme:
First of all, Alice initiates a protocol by sending her public key pk1 to Bob. Then Alice
and Bob follow the process.
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1. Commitment by a prover .
Firstly, Alice picks a random number r, such that r is less than q − 1, and
then computes x by the formula, x = gr mod p. Alice sends x to Bob.
2. Challenge from a verifier .
Bob chooses a random number e such that e∈ [1...2t], (t is a security parameter
depending on the requirements of the application/system, which is pre-specified
before the session starts) and sends it to Alice.
3. Response from a prover .
Alice computes the value of s by using the formula s = r + w*e (mod q) and
sends s as a response to Bob.
4. Verification by a verifier .
Bob checks that x = gsye (mod p) and accepts if and only if equality holds.
proof:
x = gsye (mod p)
= g(r+w∗e+kq)ye (mod p) (as s = r + w*e+kq, for some constant k)
= g(r+w∗e+kq)g(−w)∗e (mod p) (as y = g−w (mod p))
= g(r+kq) (mod p)
= gr(gq)k (mod p)
= gr (mod p) (as gq ≡ 1 (mod p))
= x
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Obviously if Alice and Bob follow the protocol, then Bob will accept Alice’s proof of
identity [55]. The above process illustrates the verification of one identity. If Alice
has d identities requested to be verified, the protocol has to be performed d times, as
shown in Figure 5.2. Thus it is cumbersome and time-consuming.
pk2
Prover Verifier
Prover
Prover
Verifier
Verifier
Verifier
Verifier
Verifier
Prover
Prover
Prover
challenge
response
1pk
challenge
response
...
dpkProver
Prover
Prover
Verifier
Verifier
Verifier
challenge
response
Figure 5.2: d Executions of an Identification Scheme for d Identities Authentication
73
5.2.2 A public-key certificate for multiple identities authenti-
cation
encryption
E      (M) = C
plaintext
decryption
D     (C) = M
sk*
encryption
E     (M’) = C’pk
decryption
D    (C’) = M’sk
destination
Sender receiver: Alice
M M’
Alice public key: (pk) 
Public File
pk*
attacker: Mallory
M’
plaintext
pk*
Figure 5.3: Impersonation by an Attacker with Public Key pk∗
As we can see from the above figure 5.3, when Alice publishes her public key pk and
expects other persons to send the secret messages encrypted by her public key. A
bad guy, Mallory, can also publish his public key pk∗ (for which he knows the related
private key) claiming it is Alice’s. Thus, Mallory can decrypt secret messagesM meant
for Alice, if he intercepts the ciphertext C. Then Mallory may replaceM with another
messageM ′, and sends the ciphertext C ′ to Alice. Therefore, Alice is cheated. In order
to avoid this issue, it is obviously necessary that a principal’s public key is associated
with the principal’s identity information in a verifiable and trustworthy way [38].
A public key certificate is a technique which uses a digital signature from the third
trusted party (also known as the Certificate Authority, CA) to bind a public key with
its holder, so that any other identities can verify that this public key really belongs
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to that holder. Thus, it prevents the bad guy like Mallory from intentionally cheating
the sender by claiming the ownership of the public keys.
A public key certificate is a formatted block of data with a number of data entries,
including a uniquely identifiable identity of the holder and his/her public key param-
eter. The following table presents an example of X.509 public key certificate, which is
one of the most common format of certificates.
Version
Serial Number
Algorithm Identifier:
Algorithm and Parameters
Issuer
Period of Validity:
Not before date, and Not after date
Subject
Subject’s Public Key
Signature
Table 5.2: X.509 Certificate [22]
The overall process whereby Bob uses a public key certificate to obtain Alice’s authentic
public key may be summarized as follows [41]:
1. (One time) Acquire the authentic public key of the Certification Authority (CA).
2. Obtain an identifying string which uniquely identifies the intended party Alice.
3. Acquire over some unsecured channel a public key certificate corresponding to
subject entity Alice and agreeing with the previous identifying string.
4. Verification
• Verify the current date and time against the validity period in the certificate,
relying on a local trusted time
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• Verify the current validity of the CA’s public key itself
• Verify the signature on Alice’s certificate, using the CA’s public key
• Verify that the certificate has not been revoked.
If all checks succeed, then the public key in the certificate is accepted as Alice’s au-
thentic key.
With the widespread applications of a variety of Internet Services such as electronic
businesses, or remote access and so on, a uniquely identifiable name with a key bound
to it becomes inadequate [14]. In other words, the application needs to make a decision
of whether the remote key holder is permitted to gain access to some services, when
given a public key certificate. Therefore, a SPKI (Simple Public Key Infrastructure)
certificate [14] was designed to meet this need.
A SPKI certificate is similar to an X.509 certificate. However, it consists of the autho-
rization information, which means it can directly show to an application whether or
not the request is authorized to perform an action [38]. In general, a SPKI certificate
extends X.509 certificate to one with authorization features.
Compared with the first way mentioned in Section 5.2.1, d identities authentication
using the SPKI certificate is only executed once. It is more efficient than the first
way. However, the main weakness is the violation of the users’ privacy. That is to say,
whenever Alice proves her identity, she will reveal her all privileges in her certificate.
It is unnecessary for her to reveal all of them, when she attempts to gain access to
a given service. She should have revealed only a minimum subset of them. Thus, to
some extend, Alice’s privacy is violated.
5.2.3 A Batching Schnorr’s scheme for multiple identities au-
thentication
From the above discussions, an interesting question arises. Is there a way to verify d
identities at the cost of less than d executions of an identification scheme and without
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violating the user’s privacy? Gennaro et. al. gives a positive answer to this question by
generalizing the authentication scheme proposed by Schnorr [55], which is illustrated
in Section 5.2.1.
His scheme [17], called a batching Schnorr’s identification scheme enables the authen-
tication of several identities at a cost very close to that of a single identity. In addition,
it protects the privacy of the prover allowing him/her to prove only the minimum set
of authorizations required to perform a given task, without disclosing that he/she is
in possession of other privileges or not [17].
The detailed explanations of Gennaro’s scheme are given as follows:
parameters:
p, q : let p and q be two prime numbers such that q|p− 1
g : let g be an element such that gq ≡ 1 (mod p), 1 ≤ g ≤ p− 1
d : the number of identities a user claims to own
wi : let wi be a random non-negative integer less than q, 1 ≤ i ≤ d
yi : let yi be a number such that yi = g
−wi mod p, 1 ≤ i ≤ d
private keys:
wi : ith identity’s private key that belongs to a user
public keys:
yi : the corresponding ith identity’s public key, such that yi = g
−wi mod p
ownership of parameters / keys:
To Be Private To Be Public
public key yi
private key wi prime numbers p and q
an element g
Table 5.3: Ownership of Parameters/Keys
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actions of scheme:
A prover, Alice initiates the identification scheme by sending a list of her public keys for
which it claims to possess the corresponding private keys [17]. The actions of scheme
are described as follows:
1. Commitment by a prover .
A prover Alice, picks up a random number r, computes x = gr mod p. Then
Alice sends x to a verifier Bob.
2. Challenge from a verifier .
A verifier Bob picks a random number e as a challenge, such that e∈ [1...2(t+logd)],
and then sends it to Alice
3. Response from a prover .
Alice computes s = r +
d∑
i=1
wi ∗ ei(mod q) and sends s to Bob.
4. Verification by a verifier .
Bob checks that x = gs ∗
d∏
i=1
ye
i
i (mod p), and accepts if and only if equality holds.
proof:
x = gs ∗
d∏
i=1
ye
i
i (mod p)
= g
(r+
d∑
i=1
wi∗ei+kq)
∗
d∏
i=1
ye
i
i (mod p) (as s =r +
d∑
i=1
wi ∗ ei + kq for some constant k)
= gr ∗ g
d∑
i=1
wi∗ei
∗ (gq)k ∗
d∏
i=1
(g−wi)e
i
(mod p) (as yi = g
−wi mod p)
78
= gr ∗ (gq)k (mod p)
= gr (mod p) (as gq ≡ 1 (mod p))
= x
As we can see from the above description that this scheme is a three-pass protocol.
By replying with only one challenge from a verifier and performing the protocol only
once, a prover can prove d identities. In addition, according to different requirements
of authentication, a prover only needs to reveal the minimal subset of his/her privi-
leges required to perform a given task. Therefore, this scheme provides a property of
privacy-preserving. Its security, like the Schnorr’s identification scheme, is based on
the difficulty of discrete logarithm problem, described in section 2.4.2 in chapter 2.
5.3 Our Multiple Identities Authentication Scheme
Through our investigations into the non-linear knapsack cryptosystem, we notice that
the non-linear knapsack system can be developed into an identification scheme simi-
lar to a batch Schnorr’s identification scheme. More importantly, it is more efficient
than the latter, because only simple multiple-precision arithmetic operations such as
addition, multiplication, and arithmetic modular are involved.
We present our scheme with a small example in Section 5.3.1 in detail, followed by a
proof in Section 5.3.2.
5.3.1 A multiple identities authentication scheme
parameters:(We omit the description of some parameters appeared in the
non-linear knapsack scheme.)
d : number of identities a user claims to own
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fi(j) : the mapping from the ith item, and the j th kind to the value(i, j) from the
private key, (i ∈ (1, ..., n), j ∈ (1, ...,m)), is denoted by fi(j). See the definition in
section 3.5.1 for detailed description.
f−1i (j) : the mapping from the value(i, j) to the ith item, and the j th kind is denoted
by f−1i (j)
f ′ki (j) : it is a value from the kth group’s public key which the user owns, k ∈ (1, ..., d),
i ∈ (1, ..., n), and j ∈ (1, ...,m)
wi : let wi be a random number such that gcd(wi, p) = 1, i ∈ (1, ..., d)
Cij : let Cij be some random integer numbers, which are (i + 1,j) elements of the
verification matrix V
V : let V be a verification matrix, which is constructed in the following way:
V =

w1 w2 ... wd
C11 C12 ... C1d
... ... ... ...
C(d−1)1 C(d−1)2 ... C(d−1)d

V −1 : let V −1 be the inverse matrix of V mod p
Ri : let Ri be random integer number embedded in the messages which is less than a
prime number p, i ∈ (1, ..., d− 1)
private keys:
f =

(f1(1), f1(2), ..., f1(m)),
(f2(1), f2(2), ..., f2(m)),
..., ..., ..., ...,
(fn(1), fn(2), ..., fn(m))

public keys:
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f ′k =

(f ′k1(1), f
′k
1(2), ..., f
′k
1(m)),
(f ′k2(1), f
′k
2(2), ..., f
′k
2(m)),
..., ..., ..., ...,
(f ′kn(1), f
′k
n(2), ..., f
′k
n(m))
,
such that f ′ki (j) = fi(j) ∗ wk(mod p ), k ∈ (1, ..., d)
ownership of parameters/keys:
To Be Private To Be Public
private key f
the multiplier wi public key f
′i
the prime number p the matrix V of the rank d− 1, (excluding the first row)
the matrix V,V −1
Table 5.4: Ownership of Parameters/Keys
actions of scheme:
As the batching Schnorr’s scheme mentioned above, a prover Alice initiates the scheme
by sending a list of her public keys for which it claims to possess the corresponding
private keys. Then a verifier Bob generates a challenge, which is a ciphertext generated
by using Alice’s public keys to encrypt a random message, say X. If Alice replies with
the same message as the original one X generated by Bob, Bob will accept what Alice
claims. Otherwise Bob refuses it.
In general, our scheme is more like an encryption/decryption scheme. That is to say,
Bob encrypts a random message by using Alice’s public keys, and sends the ciphertext
to Alice. If Alice is an honest claimant, which means she holds the corresponding
private keys, she can decrypt the ciphertext and send the authentic message back to
Bob. Then Bob will accept the identities that Alice claims to hold. It is difficult for
Alice to compute the original message from the ciphertext, if she wants to cheat Bob.
The actions of this scheme are described as follows:
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1. Challenge from a verifier.
Let x be a vertical vector (X,R1, R2, ..., Rd−1)T , and a message X be an m-ary
sequence of length n. Let X be embedded into x. Bob generates d − 1 random
number Rk which are all less than p. And Bob computes d ciphertexts Ck by
Ck =
n∑
i=1
f ′ki (xi) +
d−1∑
i=1
CikRk
Then Bob sends d ciphertexts C1, ..., Cd to the prover Alice, who claims to own
d identities.
For example, we go with d = 3 for illustration. Thus,
C1 =
n∑
i=1
f ′1i (xi) +R1 +R2
C2 =
n∑
i=1
f ′2i (xi) +R1 + 2R2
C3 =
n∑
i=1
f ′3i (xi) +R1 + 3R2
In matrix form, we could have:
(C1, C2, C3) = (
n∑
i=1
fi(xi), R1, R2) ∗

w1 w2 w3
1 1 1
1 2 3
 (5.1)
For generality, we could have the following equation:
(C1, ..., Cd) = (
n∑
i=1
fi(xi), R1, ..., Rd−1) ∗ V
2. Response from a prover .
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After Alice receives d ciphertexts, she starts to compute the value of
n∑
i=1
fi(xi)
in the following way:
(
n∑
i=1
fi(xi), R1, ..., Rd−1) = (C1, ..., Cd) ∗ V −1(mod p)
For example, as the following equation (5.2) shows, Alice computes
n∑
i=1
fi(xi) by
(
n∑
i=1
fi(xi),R1, R2)
= (C1, C2, C3) ∗

w1 w2 w3
1 1 1
1 2 3

−1
(mod p)
= (C1, C2, C3) ∗

1 2w3 − 3w2 w2 − w3
−2 3w1 − w3 w3 − w1
1 w2 − 2w1 w1 − w2
 ∗ (w1 − 2w2 + w3)−1 (mod p)
It is obvious that Alice only needs to compute the inner product of (C1, ..., Cd)
and first column of the inverse matrix V −1(mod p), which takes O(d) operations
of multiple-precision numbers.
Then Alice applies the original non-linear knapsack decryption method (which is
given in the previous section) to
n∑
i=1
fi(xi). Thus, Alice can recover the original
message X, and send it to Bob.
3. Verification from a verifier .
Bob checks the received message X with his original message. If two values
are identical, Bob accepts d identities that Alice claims. Otherwise Bob refuses
them.
83
5.3.2 Proof
Generally speaking, the processes of encrypting and decrypting rely on the properties
of matrix reversibility. That is to say, if we multiply a horizontal vector x with a regular
(d, d) matrix V to compute c = xV , where c = (C1, C2, ..., Cd), we can distribute the
secrecy of X into n pieces of information c. By putting them together, and computing
x = cV −1, we can read X. If we generate the number wi and constant number Cij
randomly, the probability that the matrix V is singular is low.
Firstly, let us go with a small example (d = 3), and V=

w1 w2 w3
1 1 1
1 2 3
 for illustration.
As we can see from the equation (5.1),
(C1, C2, C3) = (
n∑
i=1
fi(xi), R1, R2) ∗

w1 w2 w3
1 1 1
1 2 3

Thus the following equation holds (from the equation (5.2)):
(
n∑
i=1
fi(xi),R1, R2)
= (C1, C2, C3) ∗

1 2w3 − 3w2 w2 − w3
−2 3w1 − w3 w3 − w1
1 w2 − 2w1 w1 − w2
 ∗ (w1 − 2w2 + w3)−1 (mod p)
As we can see from the above equations, if the prover Alice knows the inverse matrix
V −1, she could compute the value of
n∑
i=1
fi(xi) and then recover the message. In fact,
Alice obtains (C1, C2, C3) from the verifier Bob, and she knows the inverse matrix V
−1.
It would be no problem for her computer (
n∑
i=1
fi(xi),R1, R2), although she only needs to
computer the value
n∑
i=1
fi(xi). Then Alice applies the non-linear knapsack decryption
process to that value in order to recover the message x.
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For generality, a secret message X is hidden in d pieces of information. The d cipher-
texts C1,..., Cd is computed by the following equation:
(C1, C2, ..., Cd) = (
n∑
i=1
fi(xi), R1, ..., Rd−1)

w1 w2 ... wd
C11 C12 ... C1d
... ... ... ...
C(d−1)1 C(d−1)2 ... C(d−1)d
,
If the matrix V is regular, that is, invertible, we can have the following equation,
(
n∑
i=1
fi(xi), R1, ...Rd−1) = (C1, C2, ..., Cd) ∗

w1 w2 ... wd
C11 C12 ... C1d
... ... ... ...
C(d−1)1 C(d−1)2 ... C(d−1)d

−1
(mod p)
The prover, Alice, only needs to compute the inner product of (C1, ..., Cd) and first
column of the inverse matrix of V −1(mod p), which takes O(d) operations of multiple-
precision numbers. Then applying the non-linear decryption scheme, the vector x can
be decrypted from the value
n∑
i=1
fi(xi). In addition, only the owner of the private key
can compute the value of
n∑
i=1
fi(xi), and recover the vector x.
5.4 Evaluations and Comparisons
5.4.1 Efficiency analysis
(1) Time complexity
Firstly, let us analyze the time complexity of d executions of the Schnorr’s identification
scheme for d identities authentication. The prover requires to perform d multiplica-
tions. The verifier has to perform 2d modular exponentials.
Then, let us take a look at the time complexity of the batching Schnorr’s scheme. For
a list of d identities, the prover requires 2d modular multiplications. The verifier has
to perform (d+ 1) modular exponentiations.
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However, in our scheme, the verifier performs dmultiplications, and d∗(d−1) additions,
which is dominant. As for the prover, only d multiplication are required.
The following table shows the comparisons of time complexity among these three
schemes. We use the standard O(n2) algorithm for multiplication and division of
n- bit integers.
d executions of the Schnorr scheme Batch-Schnorr scheme our scheme
Prover O(dn2) O(2dn2) O(dn2)
Verifier O(2dn3) O((d+ 1)n3) O(d2n)
Table 5.5: Comparisons of Time Complexity
(2) Experiments on running time
The following part shows the comparisons of experimental results on running time
between our scheme and the batch Schnorr scheme.
As Gennaro et. al. mentioned in their paper, their scheme was implemented using
the Microchip PICI6LF628 micro-controller. The PIC uses 8-bit instructions words
and runs at 5 MIPS (million instructions per second), and it has 16KB of write-able
storage [17]. The selections of security parameters are as follows:
Number of identities d: d = 32
Prime number q: let q be 200 bits
Prime number p : let p be about 1500 bits
Gennaro et. al. enabled the implementation to run in less than 2 seconds for their
choice of security parameters.
As for the implementation of our scheme, we program in the C language on the Linux
machine with a Celeron processor with 2.2 GHz. In order to treat two schemes under
the same condition, our selections of parameters are as follows:
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Number of identities d: d = 32
Number of items n : n = 75
Number of kinds m : m = 10
Number of mask bits for each item l : l = 20
Each mask pattern’s length ln : ln = 20 ∗ 75 = 1500
Prime number p : p > 2ln. So p > 21500, p is about 451 decimal digits, which has a
comparable size with the Batch-Schnorr scheme.
We encrypt a file with 24 characters as a challenge, and expect the intended receiver
to decrypt it. The length of plaintext depends on the number of items, which makes
the number of m-ary vector x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) be one. The following table shows our
experimental results.
Experiments) E(Encryption) (seconds) D(Decryption) (seconds) E+D (seconds)
1st Experiment 0.028 0.029 0.057
2nd Experiment 0.027 0.030 0.057
3rd Experiment 0.027 0.029 0.056
Average 0.027 0.029 0.057
Table 5.6: Running Time of Our Scheme
Compared with the running time of Batch-Schnorr scheme, ours only takes about 0.06
second, which greatly reduces the time. However, we also notice that our scheme runs
in a much faster chip. Thus for the future work we need to find out some ways to
further reduce the running time of our scheme, for example integrating the look-up
table into our implementation.
(3) Memory requirements
As for the memory requirement for our selections of security parameters, we have the
following calculation:
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Memory requirement = l∗m∗n2= 20∗10∗752bits = 1125000/8 bytes = 140625/1024
KB = 137 KB
From the time complexity point of view, our scheme takes less time than the Batch-
Schnorr scheme. However, the memory requirement of ours is about 10 times more
than the latter. This disadvantage will not be a great obstacle to our system, because
the cost of memory chip is going down frequently.
5.4.2 Security analysis
Generally speaking, we integrate the property of matrix reversibility into a non-linear
knapsack cryptosystem to invent a multiple identities authentication scheme. In other
words, the security of this scheme lies on the non-linear knapsack scheme, which is
based on an NP-complete problem. As we mentioned before, for those problems, so
far we have not been able to come up with any algorithm substantially better than
searching through all possible designs [16]. Therefore, we can assume that our scheme
is secure enough to resist any impersonation attack.
For impersonators, if they can give the proper response to the verifier, their claims will
be accepted. However, it would not be easy for them, because recovering the vector
x from the value of
n∑
i=1
fi(xi) is NP-complete, which means they have to solve this
problem in nondeterministically polynomial time. Such a class of problems has been
studied by mathematicians and computer scientists for decades, but polynomial time
bounded algorithms have not been found for even one of them. Therefore, we regard
such problems as being intractable.
As for those known attacks to the linear knapsack cryptosystems, as we mentioned
before, we have not found that they apply to our scheme. Firstly, the super-increasing
sequence is not used to construct the private key, which is the main problem that
causes the linear knapsack scheme to be broken. Furthermore, the generation of each
item for the private key is non-linear. Thus linear attacks do not apply to our scheme.
On the other hand, as we suggested in chapter 3, we scatter l/2 bits for 1 and the rest
for 0 to each kind in the private key. In addition, the number of kinds m could not be
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too large to avoid the equal-sum event. That is to say, if an attacker could find another
set of public keys kinds satisfying the equal-sum event, they could compute the value
of p by using the Euclidean algorithm, which causes the break of the system. For
security , we scatter l/2 ones for each mask, and then exhaustively check the private
keys to avoid the equal-sum event. The detailed discussions can be found in section
3.6.1 in chapter 3.
5.4.3 Possible applications of our scheme
As we mentioned in the beginning of this Chapter, our scheme is suitable to be used
in access control. That is to say, when there are several identities need to be verified
to decide the authorization, our scheme could be a good choice. Moreover, it could be
also secure without unnecessarily revealing any knowledge of the identity’s privileges.
One application of our scheme is in production processing system, where a product
needs to go through several processing steps, depending on the accesses granted.
Another interesting application is in the RFID (Radio Frequency IDentification) tags
for access control. Our scheme satisfies the features of processing speed, privacy and
authentication. In addition, the memory requirements is also in the reasonable level.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduce our second scheme, called a multiple identities authenti-
cation scheme. This scheme is much more efficient than other schemes with the similar
functionalities. Moreover, our scheme provides the property of privacy-preserving.
We firstly reviewed other similar schemes, followed by the description of our scheme.
Then we compared those schemes from two aspects, namely efficiency analysis and
security analysis. Finally, we talked about the possible applications of our scheme to
conclude this chapter.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
As a typical cryptosystem based on the knapsack problem, which is an NP-complete
problem, the Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem has an obvious advantage over other cryp-
tosystems which are based on different mathematical problems. It has the high effi-
ciency. Compared with the widely used RSA cryptosystem, it can be more than 100
times faster when the modulus of the RSA system is about 500 bits.
However, the Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem and its many variants were broken, and it
is not regarded as important any more in the cryptographic community. In order to
revive the area of cryptosystems based on an NP-complete problem, Kiriyama recently
proposed a new public key cryptosystem called the non-linear knapsack cryptosystem.
Its security is based on the NP-completeness of the non-linear knapsack problem. We
believe that this new system brings the theoretical breakthroughs to the research of
knapsack cryptosystems, and the extension of his work is our main research objective.
Cryptography has a long and fascinating history, which can be traced back thousands
of years. Chapter 2 introduces the main contributions to the development of cryptogra-
phy, which starts with the earliest forms of ciphers, namely transposition, substitution
ciphers (Caesar cipher) and one-time pad. Then we overview two types of key-based
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cryptographic algorithms, which are symmetric cryptographic algorithms and asym-
metric cryptographic algorithms. We introduce DES (Data Encryption Standard) and
AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) as the typical symmetric cryptosystems. Then
we present two categories of asymmetric cryptosystems. The first category is based on
the intractability of integer factorization and include the Rabin cryptosystem and the
RSA cryptosystem. The second one is based on the discrete logarithm problem. The
ElGamal cryptosystem is a typical system in this category.
The third category of cryptosystem is based on an NP-complete problem. This presents
in chapter 3. Firstly, we start with a general overview of the theory of NP-completeness,
followed by an introduction of the Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem. As we mentioned
before, the Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem and its variants were all broken. We generally
overview Shamir’s method for attacking to the Merkle-Hellman knapsack cryptosystem.
After that we present the main foundation of our research, the non-linear knapsack
cryptosystem. The evaluation of this scheme is given.
In chapter 4, we start to describe our work. The first scheme we invent is called an
encrypted (n, n) threshold secret sharing scheme. Only when n members in a group
all agree to pool their respective shares together, the plaintext can be recovered. We
combine the concept of the CRT (Chinese Remaindering Theorem) and the non-linear
knapsack scheme with the concept of secret sharing. Compared with other secret
sharing schemes, the increased security and high efficiency are the main merits of our
scheme.
Chapter 5 describes our second scheme, which is called a multiple identities authen-
tication scheme, developed on the basis of the non-linear knapsack scheme. Simply
speaking, it verifies the ownership of an entity’s several identities in one execution of
the scheme. Moreover, due to low computational complexity of our scheme, it can be
used in resource-constrained devices for access control.
Each of our schemes is implemented in the C language under the Linux system, and we
evaluate the running time for each. The experimental results show that our schemes
are efficient due to low computational complexity of the non-linear knapsack problem.
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6.2 Future Work
By combining the non-linear knapsack scheme with other mathematical concepts, we
proposed several new schemes. That is to say, all of our research work is based on the
non-linear knapsack scheme. In addition, the security of our schemes rests on the un-
breakability of the non-linear knapsack scheme. As we discussed before, the non-linear
knapsack scheme is based on the non-linear knapsack problem, which is analogous to
the knapsack problem, the basis of the Merkle-Hellman knapsack scheme. The knap-
sack problem has already been proven as an NP-complete problem. However, we are
unable to prove that the difficulty of breaking the non-linear knapsack cryptosystem
is equivalent to that of solving a non-linear knapsack problem. If anyone could prove
it, that would be an exciting point. Moreover, the non-linear knapsack cryptosystem
would have a strong mathematical foundation.
We have investigated existing attack methods to the Merkle-Hellman knapsack scheme
(for example Shamir’s attack method). We have found they could not directly be used
to attack the non-linear knapsack scheme. We welcome any efforts that would try to
break the non-linear knapsack scheme.
As for the (n, n) threshold secret sharing scheme presented in chapter 4, initially we
expect we could achieve privacy within a group. That is to say, even though a group
member illegally obtains all n shares from others, he/she still could not recover the
secret. Unfortunately, this goal was not achieved. This is an interesting further research
topic.
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